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CHAPTER I

THE NAACP COMES TO ST. LOUIS

St. Louis has always had a Negro minority.

In 1764,

gens de couleur helped found the city, and since that time
they have had considerable importance in its history.
During this century, black St. Louisans formed many
organizations to achieve their goals.

Perhaps the most

significant was the St. Louis branch of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

The

St. Louis branch was prominent both locally and nation
ally in the NAACP*s struggle to obtain first class citizen
ship for Negroes.
This study is the first made of the St. Louis NAACP
branch.

It covers the first forty years of the branch's

history starting in 1914 with the inception of the branch
and ending with a chapter on the post World War II period.
Throughout the study, special emphasis is given to the
branch's leadership and the effect the branch had on
St. Louis, Missouri and the nation.

1

2

Although issues and leaders changed, two continuing
characteristics were evident from the start.
flicts within the branch were numerous.

Heated con

Individuals dif

fered as to the best solution to the problem facing the
Negro.

These differences of opinion often led to deep

divisions within the branch.

During periods of strong

leadership when the conflicts were kept to a minimum, the
branch made its most notable contributions.
The second trait was the important influence exerted
upon the branch by outsiders.

The guidance which came

from the national headquarters cannot be overemphasized.
In every era, the actions of the branch (or its inaction)
was often the direct result of stimulation from New York.
Equally important was the fact that almost all the branch
presidents were not native St. Louisans.

The presidents

brought new ideas, aggressive tempers, and, in some cases,
inspired leadership to the St. Louis NAACP branch.

These

influences, originally foreign to St. Louis, helped make
the branch one of the most important in the country.
Five years before the founding of the St. Louis
branch, a group of white liberals led by Mary White
Ovington conceived the idea of an organization which was

3

later called the NAACP.

In their view, the Negro had

grown in wealth and education since the Civil War, but
"...at the beginning of this century, his position as a
citizen in the Republic was nearly hopeless."1

The race

riot in Springfield, Illinois the previous year caused
the liberals to act upon their conviction that race rela
tions were regressing.

They hoped to reverse this pro

cess by establishing the new Association.
The white liberals were joined by several Negroes led
by W. E. B. DuBois.

He rejected the leadership of Booker

T. Washington who emphasized vocational training for
Negroes while tacitly accepting second-class citizenship
for his race.

DuBois felt that the constitutional rights

of Negroes were of prime importance, and therefore, he
and some other dissatisfied Negroes joined together to
form the "Niagara Movement."

The NAACP absorbed this

organization, and DuBois took the position as editor of
the Association's official magazine. The Crisis.

1Mary

White Ovington, "The National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People," journal of Negro
History, IX (April, 1924), 107.

4

During those first years, the leaders of the NAACP
devoted much energy to increasing the size of their organi
zation,
try.

In 1912, there were but 10 branches in the coun

Two years later, there were 54, and by 1920, there

2
were about 400 NAACP branches.

The growth was due,in

part,to the efforts of Joel E. Spingarn, a white liberal
who was considered a "firebrand" even by some leaders of
the NAACP.

After he was elected chairman of the execu

tive board for 1914, he made two western trips at his own
4
expense, and on his agenda was a visit to St. Louis.
He came to St. Louis as a result of an invitation
from the City Club of St. Louis, an organization of
civic, business, and professional leaders.

Two members

of the club, Roger N. Baldwin and Gustavus A. Tuckerman,
had strong liberal beliefs and both men held numerous
offices in the City Club.

2Ibid..

Tuckerman's position as Civic

115.

Charles Flint Kellogg, A History of the NAACP.
1909-20, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), I, 98.
Oswald Garrison Villard labeled Spingarn a "firebrand."
4Ibld.,

128.

5

Secretary and his membership on the Public Affairs Com
mittee, which arranged for speakers, enabled him to make

5
the invitation to Spingarn.
Rev. John W. Day introduced ..pingarn January 19, 1914
at the City Club of St. Louis Luncheon.

Spingarn*s speech

was entitled "The Colored Citizen and His Future."6

Later

he recalled that
...as I spoke, first one person after another
left the room in order to show their unmistakable
disapproval, until when I finished only about onefourth of the audience remained.7
Many white St. Louisans also believed him to be a "fire
brand" as his reception at the luncheon indicated.
That night Spingarn spoke at St. Paul's Church on
Leffingwell Street.

His reception by the Negro audience

"...was enough to make him forget the humiliation of that
O
afternoon."

He reviewed what had happened at the City

Club luncheon and encouraged those at the meeting to form
a NAACP branch in St. Louis.

This advice was taken, and

5City

Club of St. Louis, Yearbook, (April, 1914),
pp. 2-4; Letter, Roger N. Baldwin to Daniel T. Kelleher,
September 25, 1968.
^Gustavus A. Tuckerman, ed., City Club Bulletin, IV
(February, 1914), 2.
7St.

Louis Argus, June 28, 1935.

8Ibid.

6

temporary officers were elected the same night.

Rev. W.

Sampson Brooks of St. Paul's Church was elected president;
Victoria Clay Haley was elected secretary; and Rev. B. G.
9
Shaw was elected treasurer.
Spingarn was scheduled to depart the next day, but
before leaving he wanted to establish a permanent organi
zation.

A meeting was held for that purpose at Union Mem

orial Church at Pine and Leffingwell Streets on the morn
ing of the 20th.

Upon Spingarn*s recommendation, a white

man, Gustavus A. Tuckerman, was elected president."'"0
Spingarn explained that the most successful branches had
white presidents.

They were to execute the programs ini

tiated by the board of directors.

The board was to be

mixed—black and white—but the chairman, Spingarn pointed
out, should be a Negro.

Thomas A. Curtis was elected Vice

President and chairman of the board, Maude Tanter took the
position of secretary, and Albert Burgess was the first

^Edward A. McKinney, personal interviews with author
held at 4038 Page, St. Louis, Mo., May 28, 1968 and Aug
ust 5, 1968.
' Ibid.; Letter, Baldwin to Kelleher, September 25,
1968. Tuckerman was a clergyman originally from Boston.
Prior to the formation of the NAACP in St. Louis, he had
served on the Committee on Interracial Relations.

7

treasurer.

All of the officers were Negroes except the

president and a few of the board members.^
The first internal conflict of the St. Louis NAACP
began on the 20th when Rev. W. Sampson Brooks and Rev. B.
G. Shaw, both temporary officers, were displaced in favor
of new officers.

Both men resented the action, and since

they controlled large congregations, their lack of cooperation was felt by the branch during membership drives.12
The St. Louis branch grew despite the antagonism of
Rev. Brooks and Rev. Shaw.
to about 1,000.1 1

By 1918, membership climbed

Many factors contributed to this growth.

Most important were the issues confronting the black com
munity which demonstrated the need for such an organiza
tion and rallied support to the branch.

Joseph E. Mitchell,

the managing editor of the St. Louis Arcrus, gave it enthu
siastic support.

Much of his newspaper's front page space

was devoted to the Association's membership drives in those

1^McKinney

Interviews, May 28, 1968 and August 5,
1968; McKinney pointed out Maude Tanter died shortly after
taking office, and Mrs. Helen Burrell Smith replaced her?
Julia Davis, "Down Memory Lane," Unpublished, Typed, p. 38.
St. Louis Public Library, Davis Collection. Davis credits
Mrs. Smith as being the first secretary.
"^McKinney Interviews, May 28, 1968? August 5, 1968.
13
St. Louis Argus, September 13, 1918.

3

early years.

The publicity enabled the new Association to

reach large segments of the Negro population.
devised incentives to increase membership.

The branch

Recruitment

teams were told that the team obtaining the largest number
of paid members could elect the delegates to the national
convention.

In 1917 the St. Louis Argus charged that the

branch did not carry through on its promise.14
The branch's meetings in the first few years were
conducted at various churches and the public library.

At

first gatherings were held in large churches. Later the
meetings were held in small churches because the leaders
of the large churches, finding they could not dominate
the Association lost interest.15
Although there might have been conflict between the
Urban League and the NAACP in some cities, there is little
to support the view of Miss Child Nerney of the NAACP's
National Board of Directors that the Urban League was
strong in St. Louis and used its strength to keep the
NAACP from getting a foothold.

Roger N. Baldwin was an

^•4St. Louis Argus, December 21, 1917.
15McKinney

Interviews, May 28, 1968, August 5, 1968.

9

important member of the Urban League, and he expressed a
hope that a branch NAACP would be established in St.
Louis.Rev. John W. Day introduced Joel Spingarn at
the City Club luncheon and was the president of the NAACP
branch from 1917 to 1924.

During this same period. Rev.

Day was the first vice-president of the Urban League, and

17
he served on its executive committee.

•
T. A. Curtis, a

prominent leader in the local NAACP, had a brother, W. P.

18

Curtis, who was on the board of the Urban League.

The

interlocking character of the leadership of these groups,
facilitated cooperation rather than conflict.
The activities of the St. Louis branch kept the mem
bership busy during those early years.

According to The

Crisis .the local NAACP investigated rumors of segregation

•^Kellogg, A History of the NAACP. I, 128. Miss Nerney gave two reasons why the Urban League opposed the for
mation of a NAACP branch in St. Louis. Roger N. Baldwin,
a leader of the white community and Urban League, was
thought to be too conservative, and she felt the Urban Lea
gue leaders feared the new Association would weaken their
own organization.
17
Harvey Lawrence Boxerman, "St. Louis Urban Leagues
History and Activities" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
St. Louis University, 1968), pp. 27, 29.
l8Ibid.,

29; Dr. L. Simmington Curtis. Personal in
terview with author held 5857 Waterman, St. Louis, Mo.,
August 6, 1968.

10

in the post office, during the summer of 1914, but the

19
rumors proved "...without much foundation."

This was

the first time the St. Louis branch was mentioned in the
NAACP's magazine.
During the winter of 1914-15, the branch started a
campaign to end segregated seating at the free symphony.
Representatives of the branch asked the President of the
Symphony, James E. Smith, to incorporate equal seating
privileges for all, but the request was denied.

The

branch then printed cards telling of the segregated seat
ing of Negroes and passed them out at the entrance.
results were meager; large numbers went in anyway.

The

20

The NAACP initiated a battle against the showing of
the film "The Birth of a Nation" in 1915.

Many branches

followed the national's lead, and "their hectoring had
21
considerable nuisance value."

The film had many objec

tionable features including the portrayal of Ku Klux Klan
members as noble humane youths defending white maidens in

19The

Crisis. VIII (September, 1914), 237.

2QSt.

Louis Argus. January 1, 1915.

^Mary White Ovington, The Walls Came Tumbling Down,
(New York; Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1947), pp. 129-130.

11

peril and of Negroes as peanut-eating clowns.

The St.

Louis branch evidently had some powerful friends in City
Hall, for the city authorities issued an order forbidding
the showing of the film.

It was finally shown in St.

Louis after the producers of the film secured an injunction against the order.22
continued without success.

The battle against the movie
As late as 1921 a committee

from the branch asked Mayor Kiel to forbid the showing of
the film.

The Mayor declined, stating he did not have the

necessary power.23
In sum, the founding of the St. Louis NAACP reveals
two traits which were of paramount importance throughout
its history.

In 1914 an outsider encouraged the city's

black minority to organize an NAACP branch.

Outside stim

ulation leading to action was established early as a prime
characteristic of the branch.

Crippling internal conflicts

also appeared early as a branch trait.

The replacement of

temporary officers in favor of permanent ones created ill

22The

Crisis, XI (November, 1915), 36.

"st. Louis Argus, September 23, 1921.

12

will, but the branch survived this cleavage as it did the
many that followed.
Some of the conditions which induced the founding of
the NAACP were also evident during the formation of the
St. Louis branch.

White liberals started the Association

after the Springfield riot of 1908, and it absorbed the
black group known as the "Niagara Movement."

This pro

cess was duplicated in St. Louis to the extent that a seg
ment of the Negro leadership joined a few white liberals
to form the St. Louis NAACP branch.

The early efforts of

the new Association oiten proved unsuccessful as demon
strated by the fight against the showing of the film,
"The Birth of a Nation,"

The membership list grew, how

ever, which indicated that many St. Louisans saw the need
for a NAACP branch.

The branch justified the confidence

placed in it with many achievements in the years that
followed.

CHAPTER II

THE RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION ORDINANCE OF 1916

Segregation was not new to the black St. Louisan of
sixty or seventy years ago.

Before the end of the Recon

struction Era, St. Louis schools for whites and blacks
had been separated by statute.

During the first twenty

years of this century, there were intensive efforts to
extend the areas covered by segregation laws.
At the same time St. Louisans demanded progressive
reforms in order to make the city government more democra
tic.

It was argued that public issues should be decided

by the electorate and therefore the initiative which al
lowed the public to initiate and vote on issues was in
cluded in the St. Louis City Charter of 1914.

Two years

later, St. Louis became the first city in the country
where the people voted directly into law the mandatory
residential segregation of Negroes and whites.3"

^Clement E. Vose, Caucasians Only* The Supreme Court,
the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant cases. (Berkeley:
University of California press, 1949), p. 51.
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14

The idea of statutory residential segregation was not
original with St. Louis.

After Baltimore passed its law

in 1910, many cities followed suit: Winston-Salem in 1910?
Birmingham, Alabama, and Richmond, Virginia in 1913? and
Louisville, Kentucky, in 1914.

A host of other border and

southern cities had passed residential segregation laws by
1916, and it appeared that such laws would become more nu-

2
merous throughout the country.
In St. Louis the neighborhood improvement associations
provided most of the impetus for a "Baltimore Law."

Most

of the associations were located on the periphery of the
Negro community.

These associations, which included the

home owners of certain streets, used their organizations
to promote what they considered to be the civic welfare
of their own areas.

Much of their effort was devoted to

keeping neighborhood housing values high.

They assumed

that excluding Negroes from their neighborhoods would en
hance property values.

Keeping a neighborhood white was

viewed in the same light as protection against a natural
calamity.

2The

According to the United Welfare Association

Crisis, XV (December, 1917), 69.

15

"...Negro invasion.../_ was__/...a danger...greater even
than fire, or flood, or tornado—far greater."^

it was

not only logical they believed, but necessary that the
city government pass a law which would forestall this
danger.
Soon after Baltimore enacted its law, the neighbor
hood associations of St. Louis started advocating a sim
ilar law.4

They had little success with the city authori

ties, but they built an effective organization and gained
some powerful allies.

The United Welfare Association pro

vided the bond that held together and gave leadership to
the forces which were working for residential segregation.
Delegates from various neighborhood improvement associa
tions made the policies of the United Welfare Association.
The Association's most powerful ally was the Real Estate
Exchange.

The realtors lent valuable assistence to the

Association.

In its appeals for financial help, the

Association assured its contributors the money would be

3

Letter, Felix P. Lawrence, President United Welfare
Association to St. Louis Public Library, N.d., St. Louis
Public Library, Negroes in St. Louis—Segregation File.
4St.

Louis Post-Dispatch. December 18, 1911.

16

used wisely because "the St. Louis Real Estate Exchange
guarantee/d_/ the honest expenditure of every dollar ab
solutely."5
The United Welfare Association increased its activi
ties after the new city charter of 1914 adopted the ini
tiative.

A proposed law could be placed on the ballot if

10% of the registered voters signed a petition.

The Assoc

iation started circulating a petition in the summer of
1915 for the purpose of obtaining
an ordinance to prevent ill feeling, conflict and
collision between the white and colored races in
the city of St. Louis and to preserve the public
peace and promote the general welfare by making
reasonable provisions requiring the use of sepa
rate blocks for residence by white and colored
respectively.°
The other parts of the law included the same racial res
trictions on public places such as churches, schools, and
dance halls.

The law specifically exempted domestic ser-

7
vants who resided in their employer's buildings.

5
Letter, Felix P. Lawrence to St. Louis Public
Library. N.d., St. Louis Public Library, Negroes in St.
Louis—Segregation File.
^Residential Segregation Ordinance of St. Louis (copy),
St. Louis Public Library, Negroes in St. Louis—Segregation
File.
7Ibid.

17

The literature of the segregationists maintained that
if personal encounters between races could be kept at a
minimum, the chance of a race riot would be lessened, and
that science proved race mixing biologically harmful.
basic appeal, however, was economic.

The

The law was to stop

real or threatened influx of Negroes who caused "handsome

8
neighborhoods" to go to ruin.

In particular, it was

pointed out that the small home owner had the most to lose,
and the ordinance would preclude any possibility of loss.

g

The segregationists assured the voters that such a law was
not undemocratic or un-American, for all good laws "...seek
to bestow the greatest good upon the greatest number."^®
Prejudice was disclaimed as a motive, and Abraham Lincoln
was quoted regarding the benefits of segregation.11

The

public statements of the United Welfare Association were

8Chilton

Atkinson, "Observations on the Segregation
Ordinance," Speech delivered at St. Alphonsus Parish Hall,
St. Louis, February 6, 1916, p. 5, pamphlet, St. Louis
Public Library, Negroes in St. Louis—Segregation File.
9Letter,

J. L. Barngrove, Realtor to the Editor.
St. Louis Republic. February 29, 1916.
*°Atkinson, "Observations on the Segregation Ordi
nance," p. 2, St. Louis Public Library, Negroes in St.
Louis—Segregation File.
11Ibid..

p. 6.

18

not based on blatant appeals to prejudice.

Racial harmony

and economic advantage were the primary points of emphasis.
In order to obtain an audience for these views, the
United Welfare Association used the film "The Birth of a
Nation" advantageously.

The film graphically portrayed

the chief desire of Negroes as being lust for white women.
As the audience filed out, they were confronted by repre
sentatives of the United Welfare Association distributing
12
propaganda and asking for signatures to their petition.
The Association mailed letters asking for support and
financial contributions.

The letters included a small leaf

let entitled, "Do You Realize This Danger—Your Danger?"
The leaflet listed the names and addresses of persons re
presenting about 1,000 people who claimed to have lost
from $250 to $12,000 because of Negro invasions into their
13
neighborhoods.

Such methods and arguments were success

ful, and early in December, 1915, the petition was pre
sented to the city officials.

I2The

The price of $73,285 was

Crisis. XI (November, 1915), 36; XI, (January,

1916), 140.
^United Welfare Association. "Do You Realize This
Danger—Your Danger?" (N.d.), leaflet, St. Louis Public
Library, Negroes in St. Louis—Segregation File.

19

affixed by the Board of Election Commissioners as the
cost for the special election to be held February 29,
1916.14
The opponents of the residential segregation law
were equally active.

As early as 1911, the St. Louis

Post-Dispatch characterized such a law as "fatuous and
futile."

15

In 1913, "The Committee on Housing of Negroes"

published a six-page report.

The report argued against

the "Baltimore Law" that was pending in the Municipal
Assembly of St. Louis,

in the Committee's opinion, the

race problem could not "...be solved by crystalizing pre
judice into legislation."16

By the spring of 1915, a com

mittee of fifteen whites and fifteen Negroes was waging
an extensive campaign against the attempt to pass the
segregation ordinance.

One white leader of the committee,

Roger N. Baldwin, prepared a pamphlet for publication and

14St.

Louis Republic. December 11, 1915.

15St.

Louis post-Dispatch, December 18, 1911.

16

The Committee on Housing of Negroes. "The Legal
Segregation of Negroes in Saint Louis," January, 1913,
leaflet, St. Louis Public Library, Negroes in St. Louis—
Segregation File.

20

distribution.*"^

The local NAACP pressured candidates for

the Board of Alderman to take a stand on the segregation
ordinance.

18

Many of the aldermen came out against it.

These early efforts were successful, and the United Wel
fare Association was forced to circumvent the city govern
ment and resort to the initiative.
Until the fall of 1915, the battle was fought between
St. Louisans with much of the effort against the proposed
law falling upon the white leaders of the community.

In

deed, the masses of Negroes in St. Louis were suprisingly
indifferent.

They were already segregated, and they

19
reasoned passing a law would make little difference.
The Negro leaders were concerned, and the NAACP branch
continued its activities.

When it appeared that the law's

advocates were making great strides with the initiative,
the NAACP decided to help its St. Louis branch.

•*-7The Crisis. X (May, 1915), 39; Letter, Roger N.
Baldwin to Daniel Kelleher, September 25, 1968. Baldwin
organized the groups opposed to the ordinance.
*"8St. Louis Argus. April 9, 1915; The Crisis. XI
(March, 1916), 260.
19The

Crisis. XI (March, 1916), 240.

21

The NAACP sent Miss Kathryn M. Johnson, one of its
field workers, to St. Louis.

She took charge of the head

quarters set up in the Knights of Pythias Hall which was
lent by that Negro fraternal group.

She received help at

the headquarters from Mrs. Helen A. Smith, the secretary
of the branch? Miss Helen Spears, the stenographer and
clerk in charge of the headquarters; and a solicitor in
20
charge of auditing all accounts.
Once the initiative petition started circulating, the
battle revolved around campaigns to reach as many people
as possible.

During September, Kathryn Johnson reached

an estimated 5,000 people by addressing groups in churches,
schools, and theatres.
ned for October.
meetings.

A house-to-house canvass was plan

Miss Johnson also helped organize public

One such meeting was held at the Central Bap

tist Church, and the speakers included Congressman L. C.
Dyer of St. Louis, Miss Child Nerney of the NAACP's na
tional office, and clergyman B. G. Shaw.

The Negro com

munity appreciated Kathryn Johnson's "valuable assist21
ance."

20Ibid..

XI (January, 1916), 140-141.

21
Ibid., XI (November, 1915), 36? St. Louis Argus.
October 29, 1915; March 3, 1916.

22

The national office provided help, but St. Louisans
did most of the work.

Local Negro NAACP leaders chair-

raaned the various committees in charge of publicity, legal
matters, and finances.

Such leaders as Charles Pitman,

Thomas A. Curtis, Homer G. Phillips, and George L. Vaughn
played prominent roles.

22

The chairman of the branch

executive committee, Charles Pitman, was indispensable.
He was a "bright" Negro,

23

and could go to meetings from

which Negroes were excluded.

This enabled the NAACP to

keep abreast of what the opposition was doing.

Pitman

was a realtor, and he spent his own money to keep the
fight going.

One observer remarked that Pitman spent at

least some time every day at the headquarters while the
fight continued.24
Opponents of the "Baltimore Law" published and dis
tributed volumes of propaganda.

22St.

Negro girls and women

Louis Argus. August 6, 1915.

2*»

Curtxr interview, August 6, 1968. This term in the
black community denotes one having a very light complexion.
Curtis said Pitman could and did pass easily for a white.
24McKinney

1968.

Interviews, May 28, 1968 and August 5,

23

passed out circulars on the streets bearing a cartoon de
picting a white man lashing a Negro with the caption
"Back to slavery."25

Anti-segregationist literature in

cluded "Negro Segregation—A Measure to Assassinate a
26
Race" by George E. Stevens.

A brochure entitled "A

Shaming Stigma Upon St. Louis" used a Fitzpatrick car
toon from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

The cartoon was

named "The Great Divide," and it pictured the black and
white communities glaring at each other over an alley.
The reader was informed that "Segregation would create

27 and was not in the American tradition
moral slavery,"
of fair play.

Another piece of literature, a one page

cardboard leaflet, reported that the segregation law was
unconstitutional, un-Christian, and "...nefarious, hideous,
dangerous, and un-American and calculated to undermine our

25"Negro

Segregation in St. Louis," Literary Digest.
LII, (March 18, 1916), 702.
2^fhe

Crisis. XI (November, 1915), 36.

"st. Louis Branch NAACP, "A Shaming Stigma Upon St.
Louis Would Be Race Segregation by Law," (N.d.), Leaflet,
St. Louis Public Library, Negroes in St. Louis—Segrega
tion File.
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civilization and the principles of democracy upon which

28
it is founded."

The NAACP did not hesitate to enter

vigorously into the battle of words, and by December over
20,000 pieces of literature had been sent out from the
29
branch headquarters.
In December, 1915, the forces opposing the proposed
law had a moment of optimism, for it looked as if the
money for the election might not be appropriated.

The

Board of Aldermen asked the City Counselor to submit an
opinion on the constitutionality of the initiative clause
in the new charter, and then adjourned for two weeks.
After Christmas the fight was on again.
Even before the city counselor reported back to the
Board of Aldermen, there was some talk of testing the
constitutionality of the initiative in the courts.

Based

on "...the best legal opinions in Missouri and /_ the

28
St. Louis Branch NAACP, "Reasons Why Residential
Segregation Should Be Defeated," (N.d.), Leaflet, St.
Louis Public Library, Negroes in St. Louis—Segregation
File.
2^St.

Louis Argus, December 17, 1915.

3Qst. Louis Republic, December 17, 1915y The Crisis,
XI (February, 1916), 194-195.
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advice of_/ Mr. Story, Counsel for the National Association...M, the NAACP opposed this approach.

32
St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
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So did the

Even so, some leaders in the

Negro community announced their intention to test the

33
initiative clause.

This caused some conflict, and

Kathryn Johnson, the NAACP's field agent in St. Louis
wrote a public letter calling for unity.3<*

The NAACP,

through The Crisis, warned that "...the bourbons of St.
Louis will have reason to congratulate themselves if the
colored people split on this issue while the enemy as
3C
usual stands as one."

Finally, the local NAACP agreed

to take the case, but this did not stop the factionalism.
The disagreement now centered on who would take the case
and on what grounds.

One group of Negro ministers wanted

to hire some white lawyers and attack the proposed law on
the grounds that the segregation ordinance might soon be

3J-The

Crisis. XI (January, 1916), 141.

3^St.

Louis Post-Dispatch, December 18, 1915.

33The

Crisis. XI (January, 1916), 141.

3^St.

Louis Argus, December 17, 1915.

35The

Crisis. XI (January, 1916), 141.
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declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the
United States.

The branch leaders wanted their legal

staff to handle the case.

The branch attorneys wanted

to argue the position that the Constitution of Missouri
did not permit the people of St. Louis to legislate by
means of the initiative.
the case in court.

Finally, the branch filed

Homer G. Phillips and George L.

Vaughn, the branch's counsel, pleaded the case, and
Charles Pitman, the Chairman of the Executive Committee,
was the plaintiff.

The money used for the suit could

have been saved because mid-way through January, the

37
court decided against Pitman.
How badly the split over legal strategy hurt the
opponents of the "Baltimore Law" is hard to ascertain.
Certainly the wasted time, effort, and money did not
further the cause.

The NAACP consoled itself by explain

ing the division in terms of the heritage of slavery
which had left the Negro an uncertain person.

38

Splits

36St. Louis Argus. December 17, 1915.
37Ibid.,

January 21, 1916? The Crisis. XI (February,
1916), 194-195.
38The

Crisis. XI (March, 1916), 240.
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of this type were not unusual.

Negroes in other cities

similarly threatened also spent needed energy fighting

39
amongst themselves.
By January, 1916, the opposing forces increased the
pace of their campaign.

The United Welfare Association

favored passage as did the Real Estate Exchange which
included almost all the real estate companies.

On Janu

ary 28, 1916, the Polish Americans of St. Louis held a

40
special meeting and publicly endorsed the law.

As the

election came closer, the United Welfare Association por
trayed it as a simple contest of White vs. Black.
How can we afford to let the Negro whip the
white man in this election. Shall such a report
as that go out over the country...
The Negroes have raised over $25,000 to de
feat the white man in his fight for segregation
and home protection. They have registered in the
thousands, driving to the polls in style in limou
sines. Hundreds if not thousands are reported to
have been shipped in here from Memphis and the
south to swell the Negro vote....
The forces in favor of the law were substantial, and the
tone of their appeal while not outlandishly racist.

3^Kellogg,

A History of the NAACP. I, 186.

^St. Louis Republic, January 29, 1916.
41Letter,

Felix P. Lawrence to St. Louis Public Lib
rary. N.D., St. Louis Public Library, Negroes in St.
Louis—Segregation File.
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certainly was calculated to appeal to the average white's
inner prejudice.
If the forces in favor were substantial, the forces
against seemed almost overwhelming.

Not only was the

Negro community opposed, but also 23 of the 28 aldermen
had declared themselves against such an ordinance.42
L. C. Dyer, Republican congressmen from St. Louis worked
against it, as did most of the Republican leadership of
the city.

State Senator Michael Kinney (Democrat) used

his political organization to distribute handbills against

43
the proposed law.

The Jewish Community and the Social

ist Party openly opposed the passage of such a law.44
Most of the political leadership of the city were against
the residential segregation ordinance.

42The

Crisis. XI (March, 1916), 260.

43McKinney

Interviews, May 28, 1968, August 5, 1968.

^Merle Fainsod. "The Influence of Racial and Na
tional Qroups in St. Louis Politics (1908-1928)." (Un
published Masters "dissertation." Washington University,
St. Louis, June, 1929), p. 59. On page 58, Fainsod mis
takenly states that the Negro community was in favor of
the new law. This is a rather important mistake in this
comprehensive Master's work.
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The newspapers were generally opposed to the law.
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch as early as 1911 expressed
its opposition, and continued to carry this view before
and after the election.

The St. Louis Arcms was solidly

opposed and devoted a great deal of space to the battle.
The St. Louis Globe-Democrat also came out against the
law, but basically the paper crowded its pages with other
news.

The St. Louis Republic editorialized briefly

against the law, but generally most of the space on this
topic was devoted to the pros and cons of the proposed
law.45
The NAACP made an attempt to gain the support of the
Catholic Church.

Kathryn Johnson went to Father McGuire

to enlist his support.

She asked him to persuade Arch

bishop Glennon of St. Louis to come out publicly against
the ordinance.

Although Father McGuire was the pastor

of St. Elizabeth, a Negro church, he declined Kathryn
Johnson's request.

She broke down in tears as Father

McGuire stated he believed in the segregation of the
races,

cardinal Gibbons was asked to intervene, but he

45St.

Louis Republic, March 2, 1916. This issue
gives a good summation of how the St. Louis newspapers
stood on the controversy.
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telegraxned back that Archbishop Glennon was supreme in
his own diocese.

He also advised the NAACP field worker

to contact the Papal delegate in Washington, D. C.

This

was done, and Archbishop Glennon finally made the public
statement desired by Miss Johnson.

The pronouncement by

the church leader came so late that it could not have
made much difference, for few of the faithful were aware

46
of the church s stand.
All concerned parties made eleventh hour efforts.
The City Club of St. Louis held a debate four days be
fore the election.

One of the debaters, the Attorney for

the City of Louisville, Kentucky, Pendleton C. Beckley,
told the audience that the question was moral and not
political.

Why, he asked, could not the principle of

segregation be applied to housing as it had been to
schools and hotels?

His opponent. Judge A. D. Nortoni,

rested his argument on the supposition that the proposed
law was unconstitutional.

Walter McGinnis, Counsel for

the Real Estate Exchange disputed this point, and

46McKinney

Interviews, May 28, 1968, August 5, 1968.
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publicly announced that the proposed law was "both lawful
and wise.1,47
The St. Louis Republic was informed by telephone that
nine priests of the city had preached the previous Sunday
against the segregation law.

However, of the priests who
AO

could be reached, none confirmed the caller's claim.
On the morning of the election, the Board of Election Com
missioners was forced to issue supplementary instructions
to the police working at the polling stations.

This action

was necessary because challengers were appearing at poll
ing places with unauthorized credentials.

Reportedly, the

NAACP issued the credentials but the newspaper incorrectly
called the Association, "the Society for the Advancement
49
of Colored People."

47St.

Louis Republic, February 17, 1916? February 26,
1916. The Louisville Residential Segregation Law was be
ing appealed at that time to the United States Supreme
Court by the NAACP.
48Ibid.,

February 29, 1916.

49
St. Louis Post-Dispatch. February 29, 1916. The
credentials were signed by Gustavus Tuckerman, who was
president of the local NAACP, Mrs. A. J. Smith, and the
rubber stamp signature of John Schmoll, Chairman of the
Republican City Committee.
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On election day, the opponents of the segregation
law hoped for a light turn out.

Of the 140,010 registered

voters eligible to vote, only 9,846 were black men.

Both

sides publicly expressed confidence, but privately those
at the branch headquarters said the ordinance would win
by a big majority.

This prediction proved correct as the

voters turned out in unusually large numbers for the
special election.

Only three of the city's twenty-eight

wards were carried against the ordinance, and the final
vote was 52,220 in favor to 17,877 against.

50

The white

wards closest to Negro residential areas voted most heavily
for the ordinance.

The Republican leadership of the city

who served as allies in the fight against the ordinance
"...would not, dared not, or could not deliver their wards
as they had promised."51

Only a Democrat, Mike Kinney,

was able to carry his ward, and the Negro leadership

5°St.

Louis Republic. February 29, 1916; March 1,
1916. There were two proposed laws. One made it illegal
to invade a block if its residents were 100% of one race.
The other was more stringent, for it lowered the percent
to 75%. Both laws were passed and the most stringent one
took effect.
51Fainsod,

"The Influence of Racial and National
Groups in St. Louis Politics," pp. 58, 60.
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pointed an accusing finger at the Republican leaders and
cried "double-cross."

52

The St. Louis Argus summed up

the election results with the headline, "Prejudice Wins
Election.
The people had spoken.

It was clear that the vast

majority of St. Louisans wanted residential segregation
formalized by law.

The St. Louis Republic called on both

sides to keep friction at a minimum and urged St. Louis
Negroes to accept the new law and improve on what they
had.54
Charles Pitman, the Chairman of the St. Louis branch
Executive Committee, was not willing to accept the will of
the majority.

He contacted Col. Wells Blodgett, chief

counsel for the Wabash Railroad and an ex-officer in the
Union Army, in the hope of taking the new law into the
CC

courts.

On March 7, a meeting was held at Col. Blodgett's

52St.

Louis Republic, March 1, 1916.

55St.

Louis Argus, March 3, 1916.

54St.

Louis Republic, March 1, 1916.

55McKinney

Interviews, May 28, 1968, August 5, 1968.
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office where strategy was planned.

A committee, includ

ing the ex-Secretary of Interior Charles Nagel, Col. Blodgett, Percy Werner, Judge Selden P. Spencer, Joseph Wheless,
and Judge Leo Rassieur prepared to file a suit, without
charge to the NAACP, restraining the city officials from

56
enforcing the new ordinance.

Before the end of the

month, the case was before the court, and by April, 1916,
Judge D. P. Dyer had issued a temporary injunction enjoin
ing the city from operating under the new segregation
ordinance.

This injunction was to remain in force until

a similar case pending before the United States Supreme
Court had been decided.

57

On November 5, 1917, the Supreme Court decided unan
imously that the Louisville residential segregation law
CO

was unconstitutional.

Judge D. P. Dyer, who had issued

58Ibid.;

McKinney remembered that the local NAACP
did pay $1.00 to Col. Blodgett; The Crisis, XII (May,
1916), 37.
57St.

Louis Argus, March 24, 1916; April 21, 1916.
Judge D. P. Dyer was related to Congressman L. C. Dyer
who had worked aqainst the passage of the ordinance.
L. C. Dyer later introduced an anti-lynch bill into Con
gress. (See Chapter III.) The Dyer family had long been
considered friends of the Negro.
58Buchanan

vs. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, November, 1917.

35

the temporary injunction said he would make this injunc
tion permanent if asked to do so because both the St. Louis
59
law and the Louisville law involved the same principle.
In March of the following year. Judge Dyer made permanent
the temporary injunction issued over a year before.60
The victory, while important, was nevertheless some
what hollow.

Private agreements (restrictive covenants)

among property owners restricting the sale of their pro
perty from Negroes achieved the objective fought for by
the proponents of the residential segregation ordinance.
These agreements had the force of a contract and were en
forceable in the courts.

In 1948, the highest court in

the land would declare such covenants un-enforceable in
the courts, and St. Louis would again play a central role
in this fight of a generation later.

59St.

Louis Post-Dispatch. November 6, 1917.

6;)St.

Louis Arcrns. March 29, 1918.

CHAPTER III

THE EAST ST. LOUIS RACE RIOT AND THE ANTI-LYNCH
CAMPAIGN—CAUSE AND EFFECT

During the first hot days of July, 1917, the United
States experienced its worst race riot of the century.
According to one eye witness, the East St. Louis Riot was
more than a race riot—it was a massacre.

To the chant

of "get a nigger...get another," mobs stopped street cars
and pulled off, stoned, and clubbed blacks without regard
to age or sex.

White prostitutes grabbed the hair and

clothing of fleeing Negro women, and then beat them about
the face and breasts with sticks and stones.

A group of

Negro men attempted to submit to some white rioters but
as they held their hands high, the rioters clubbed them
with gun butts.

As they lay on the street, young girls

bloodied their stockings by kicking the limp bodies.

The

mob threatened ambulance drivers if they stopped to pick
up wounded blacks.

In one attempt to give a wounded

Negro a proper southern death by lynching, the clothes
line broke, but stronger rope was found.

36

As Negroes fled

37

from their burning houses, they were picked off like
"running rabbits."

One reporter saw the white East St.

Louis mob throw a small black child into a blazing shack.
When it was all over, 200 houses had been destroyed, and
the estimates of those killed ranged from forty-seven to
1
several hundred.
The use of Negroes as strike breakers and a lax city
government appear to have brought on the explosive situa
tion.

There had been some conflict between blacky and

whites earlier that summer, and Govenor Lowden of Illinois
had sent in the militia.

The militia, according

the

St. Louis NAACP in a letter to Govenor Lowden, was "...dis
criminating in favor of whites."

This alleged discrimin

ation took the form of disarming the Negro community while
2
white citizens were allowed to keep their arms.
In July, the hate in East St, Louis erupted and
spilled forth destruction and death.

While the rioting was

-^St, Louis Post-Dispatch. July 3, 1917? Elliott M.
Rudwick, Race Riot at East St, Louis, July 1917 (Carbondales SIU Press, 1964), Chapter 5.
2St.

Louis Argus, June 1, 1917? June 8, 1917.
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at its height, the St. Louis "National Association for
the Advancement of Negroes" ^ sic_/ called a meeting
which 200 persons attended.

At the meeting, the NAACP

leadership made plans for helping the refugees coming in
to St. Louis, and prepared appeals asking President Wil
son and Govenor Lowden to take steps to stop the killing

3
in East St. Louis.

The existing social organizations in

St. Louis handled most of the relief for the East St.
Louis refugees.

Many were housed in a big warehov.se across

from city hall.

St. Louis Negroes, acting as individuals,

4
performed numerous other services for these refugees.
As an organization, the local NAACP was primarily
concerned with the legal work which developed as a result
of the riot.

The U.S. District Attorney of East St. Louis

announced immediately following the riots, that under a
new statute, the city of East St. Louis was liable up to

3Ibid.,

July 6, 1917? St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
July 3, 1917.
4McKinney

Interviews, May 28, 1968 and August 5,
1968. McKinney indicated the refugees were met and
counseled as they crossed the bridge into St. Louis;
Curtis Interview, August 6# 1968. Curtis went to East
St. Louis while the riot continued in order to obtain
the pay checks of some of the riot refugees.
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5
$5,000 for each person killed.

William E. B. DuBois

came to St. Louis to form a committee of St. Louisans to
gather evidence and take testimony.6

in a public letter.

Homer G. Phillips, speaking for the legal committee of
the branch, told the victims of the riot that the NAACP
stood ready to represent them without charge in any attempt
to recover damages for their loss.

Much of the branch's

legal work concerned the collection of damages, and ulti
mately the branch handled a large number of the nearly
7
2,000 claims filed against the city of East St. Louis.
To carry on this work, the branch immediately called
for $2,000 in donations for a fund to support relief
Q
legal action.

and

By December, 1917, the Committee of che

East St. Louis Refugee Defense Fund had raised over
9
$4,000, but in the collection and disbursement of the
legal defense money, a schism developed within the Negro
community.

The controversy revolved around Dr. Leroy N.

5St.

Louis Post-Dispatch, July 6, 1917.

8St.

Louis Argus, July 13, 1917.

7
Ibid.. August 3, 1917.
8Ibid..

July 13, 1917.

8Ibid..

December 21, 1917.
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Bundy, an East St. Louis dentist and local political
figure.

He was one of several Negroes charged with in

citing the riot.*-®

Dr. Bundy became the scapegoat for

the whites in their attempt to explain the riot as a
Negro conspiracy.

He also became a hero for a nation

wide Negro audience.

To raise legal defense money.

Dr. Bundy accepted many speaking engagements around the
country.
people.

He seemed to enjoy taking his case to the
Being a national celebrity appealed to him

more than making a living at his chosen t r a d e , a n d
the temper of white East St. Louisans was such that
Dr. Bundy was safer outside the city.
From the speaking tours Dr. Bundy not only expected
to raise money for the defense fund, but he also planned
to pay his living expenses.

This might have been pala

table to the NAACP, which was handling his defense, but
Bundy's refusal to make an account of what was collected
was not acceptable to the Association.

The feud first

developed between Bundy and the branch's Executive

^Several whites were also charged.
•^Rudwick, Race Riot at East St. Louis, p. 122.
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Committee led by Charles Pitman.

By April, 1918,

Dr. Bundy and the members of the branch's Executive
12
Committee were not on speaking terms.

fused to sanction his appeals for money.

The branch re
Bundy asked

the branch leaders if the NAACP planned to furnish him
enough money to support himself.^-3

Dissatisfied with

the branch's answer that he should support himself with
dentistry, he continued on his speaking tour.

The St.

Louis branch thereafter described his personal appear
ances as "junkets."^4
The St. Louis NAACP recommended to the national
office that they withdraw from the case.

The national

was reluctant to follow the branch's recommendation and
promptly called a meeting where Dr. Bundy was to present
his side of the story.

The meeting was a fiasco, and

the national came to the same conclusion as the St.
Louis branch because
His (Bundy*s) demeanor throughout the hear
ing impressed the committee as lacking in frank
ness and was characterized by an apparently

12Ibid..
13The

pp. 122-123.

Crisis, XVI (September, 1918), 225.

14Rudwick,

Race Riot at East St. Louis, pp. 122-123.
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strong desire to avoid disclosing the real facts
in the situation to the committee.^
The national asked its followers to stop contributing
money to Bundy because the Association could not strictly
account for collections and expenditures.

In order to pre

vent scandal, the NAACP never sponsored individuals who
16
took unaudited money.
Dr. Bundy was not without friends.

Attorney Homer G.

Phillips, a leader in the St. Louis Negro community and the
local NAACP, continued to serve as one of Bundy's counsel.
Other St. Louisans were displeased with the NAACP's deci
sion to drop the case.

On the front page of the St. Louis

Argus. a letter condemned the NAACP for withdrawing.

The

letter pointed out that the Bundy case was a cause to which
all black men should rally.

It was signed by a long list

17
of people including many prominent Negro clergymen.

Per

haps it was a cause behind which all Negroes should have
united, but the NAACP's fear of scandal and loss of con
trol over the funds became the overriding factor in its
decision to resign from the Bundy Case.

•*-5The Crisis. XVI (September, 1918), 224.
"^Ibid.. pp. 225.
^St. Louis Argus, September 27, 1918.
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The East St. Louis Riot undoubtedly caused fears and
apprehensions in the white community# but within the Negro
community and parts of the white leadership the riot
served as a first-hand reminder of the Negro's tenuous
position in the American society.

New efforts were made

to improve his position including the new vigor given
the NAACP anti-lynching campaign.
The NAACP started the anti-lynch campaign in 1911.
The original plan was to investigate# educate# and to
bring pressure to bear on public officials to punish
mobs.1Q

The branch was active early in this campaign.19

After the East St. Louis Riot, the campaign was expanded
to include the demand for state and federal laws to pre
vent mob action.
Congressman Leondias C. Dyer launched these efforts
on the national level.

Since 1910, Congressman Dyer had

represented Missouri's 12th district which included the

S ISovington# "The National Association," p. 112.
1%t.

Louis Argus, September 29, 1916. That year
the St. Louis NAACP raised $115.37 for the anti-lynch
campaign.
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majority of St. Louis Negroes.

3y 1920, the black popula

tion of that district had increased to where Negroes
formed a majority of those voting the Republican ticket.
As the Negro population increased. Republican Dyer's con20
cern for the welfare of blacks was re-doubled.-

Congress

man Dyer and Charles Pitman, an activist in local Repub
lican politics and the chairman of the executive board of
the branch, were friends.

Another friend of Dyer's was

Dr. T. A. Curtis, an active executive board member and
later the first Negro president of the branch.

No doubt

these men consulted about the possibility of a federal
anti-lynch law.

21

Added to these practical motivations

was the long-standing reputation of the Dyer family as
a champion of the Negro.
Whatever his motives, Dyer introduced a bill into
Congress which would have made lynching a federal crime.
In 1918, he told Arthur Spingarn, Chairman of the NAACP's
22
Legal Committee, that this was his intention.

In 1922,

2®Fainsod,

"The Influence of Racial and National
Groups in St. Louis Politics (1908-28)," pp. 103-104.
21McKinney

Interviews; May 28, 1968, August 5, 1968;
Curtis Interview, August 6, 1968.
22Kellogg,

A History of the NAACP. I, 226-27.
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the House of Representatives passed Dyer's Anti-Lynching
Bill by the vote of 230 to 119, but the Senate blocked
its passage.

During the late 1930's, the northern Demo

crats again brought up the same type of legislation only
to see it defeated by a Senate filibuster.23
The St. Louis NAACP also increased its campaign
against mob violence on the state level.

Govenor Gardner

remained silent despite a telegram from the branch asking
him to punish the mob responsible for the Moberly, Mis
souri lynching of 1919.24

The branch thereafter lobbied

for a state anti-lynch law.

In 1921 such a bill was de-

25
feated in the Missouri Legislature.

During the 20's

anti-lynch legislation was a popular topic, and the
branch sponsored such speakers as Congressman L. C. Dyer
and Walter White from the NAACP national headquarters to
discuss this issue in St. Louis.2®

In the early 1930's,

23jack,

History of the National Association. Assoc
iation for the Advancement of Colored People (Bostoni
Meadon Publishing Co., 1943), pp. 31-32.
24St.

Louis Argus, November 21, 1919.

2^Ibid.,

October 21, 1921.

26Jbid.,

April 20, 1923.
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another effort was made to obtain an anti-lynch statute
for Missouri.

The bill was introduced by State Senator

Michael Kinney# Democrat from St. Louis, and it passed
27
both houses only to be vetoed by Govenor Caulfield.
Even as late as 1938, anti-lynching was still an issue.
The branch sent letters to president Roosevelt and the
Govenors of Alabama and Louisiana protesting lynchings,

28
but without result.
The St. Louis branch played an integral part in the
NAACP's anti-lynch campaign.

Much exertion went into the

anti-lynch campaign, but anti-lynch laws were never en
acted by either Congress or the state of Missouri.

This

part of the attack on mob action was not successful, but
the original objective of the NAACP pertaining to educa
tion did attain results.

As Roy Wilkins pointed out,

hardly anyone of prominence spoke out against lynching
in 1919, yet by the late 1930*s, public opinion had been
reversed.^

28Ibid.,
29Rayford

September 29, 1938.

W. Logan, ed. What the Negro Wants,
(Chapel Hillt University of North Carolina Press, 1944),
p. 119.

CHAPTER IV

LEADERSHIP CHANGE, WHITE TO BLACK 1919-1932

During the 1920's, the people of this nation were
pre-occupied with enjoying themselves.

The popularity

of sports, motion pictures, and the automobile all attest
to this concern with personal gratification.

An equally

important characteristic of the 20*s was summed up by
President Coolidge when he remarked, "The business of
America was business."

Almost everyone worked hard at

acquiring his share of the prosperity.

Americans were

less inclined toward reform movements at this time, for
people concerned with business and pleasure usually have
little time for idealistic notions.

Under these condi

tions, it is little wonder that liberal and reform groups
suffered or found themselves exerting much effort just to
keep the gains they had made in the past.
The NAACP, generally falling into the classification
of a reform group, found itself beset with the same over
all problems of other such organizations.

The finances

of the national were such that the continuation of the

47
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Association was a day-to-day problem.

Any group existing

on a subsistence level could hardly be expected to have
a well-planned dynamic program.

The legal activities of

the NAACP were extremely limited, and most of the work
was relegated to the various branches."1"
The St. Louis NAACP relied upon the national office
for direction and support.

In the era after World War I,

the national was often unable to give this guidance, and
partly because of this, the local NAACP fell into periods
of inactivity.

The branch's hibernation during the winter

of 1918-19 caused the people of St. Louis "...to wonder
what had become of the local branch of the NAACP?"2

The

St. Louis Argus in 1922 pointed out that people would
support a group which tojk the lead, but the "mere main
taining of an organization does not justify its existence
when the real work of the organization is being neglected.

^William Otis McMahon, Jr., "The Litigation of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo
ple, 1910-42." (Unpublished Master's dissertation),
Howard University, Washington D. C., June 1942), p. 14.
2
St. Louis Argus. February 28, 1919.
3Ibid..

June 9, 1922.
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Throughout the post war years, membership campaigns
took most of the branch's energy, and in some years it
4
was practically the only object of effort.

Often as an

incentive to secure a large membership, a prize was of5
fered.

Most members would renew their dues each year,

but they lacked the initiative to forward the money with
out a reminder.

The same twenty or twenty-five people

attended the majority of the branch's meetings.

At two

or three meetings a year as many as 400 people would turn

&
out to hear a well-known speaker.

The maintenance of

the Association in St. Louis, given the condition of the
period, was a herculean task.
Lacking an overall plan of attack from the national
headquarters, the branch's efforts were sporadic and
generally limited to matters of local concern.

These

^Curtis Interview, August 6, 1968.
5
St. Louis Argus. February 18, 1927. A trip to New
York or $150 was offered to the person securing the
largest amount of money over $300. Some membership dues
were one dollar per year. This was a large order especial
ly during the 1920s when membership seldom exceeded 1,000.
^Curtis Interview, August 6, 1968.
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activities were basically of a defensive nature.

In the

summer of 1919, under George L. Vaughn's direction, a com
mittee investigated the complaints of Negro soldiers who had
been gassed and wounded, but whose discharge papers claimed
7

they had had no battle engagement.

The branch appointed

a special committee that year to help prev^rit riots like
O

those experienced in Chicago and Washington, D. C.

The

branch's activities in 1920 included helping prevent the
extradition of a seventeen-year old boy to Tennessee and
the investigation of the murder of a Negro at Webster
9
Groves, Missouri.

The following year, the branch fought

the formation of the Ku Klux Klan in St. Louis.

Protests

declaring the purposes of the Klan to be illegal were made
to city and state officials.^"0

In 1923, Mayor Kiel of

St. Louis addressed one of the branch's meetings,and
2,181 signatures from St. Louis were added to the petition

7St.

Louis Argus, April 26, 1919.

3Ibid..

August 8, 1919.

9Ibid.,

January 21, 1921.

1QIbid..

May 13, 1921.

i:LIbid..

July 20, 1923.
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circulated by the NAACP for the "Houston martyrs" in
12
prison at Leavenworth, Kansas.

The NAACP hoped that if

enough signatures were obtained the President would pardon
the Negro soldiers who they felt were unjustly imprisoned.
Starting in 1924, the branch became involved in the re
strictive covenant cases arising in St. Louis.

Segregated

housing was achieved in St. Louis by restrictive covenants
after the Supreme Court declared the Louisville segrega
tion ordinance unconstitutional.

Restrictive covenants

were private agreements between neighbors declaring that
none of the parties would sell their houses to Negroes.
These contracts were used to cause the eviction of Negroes
who had moved into neighborhoods covered by such agree
ments.

The handling of these cases lacked a comprehen

sive plan.

In 1931 the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld

the Cote Brillante Avenue Restrictive Covenant and Negroes
were given sixty days to vacate the white neighborhood.13

^Ibid., December 28, 1923; January 4, 1924. Members
of an Army company of Negroes had gotten into a gun battle
with some local whites of Houston, Texas. They were con
victed and sent to Leavenworth Army Prison. The NAACP felt
that this was unjust because the soldiers had merely de
fended themselves.
13Ibid.,

1931.

March 27, 1925; October 9, 1925; October 16,
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The branch in 1928 was also involved in fighting the extra
dition of Reverend P. A. Cantrell who did not want to be
sent back to Mississippi to face mail fraud charges.^
The year 1929 marked the beginnings of increased
activity on the part of the St. Louis NAACP branch.

The

activity was noted by the St. Louis Argus and more space
was devoted to its enterprises.

For example, in 1929, the

branch raised the issue of police brutality for the first
time.

The local NAACP became engaged in this fight by

15
investigating complaints.

As the effects of the de

pression began to take hold, there was increased compe
tition for jobs.

The branch started a "buy where you can

work" movement and formed a committee to check on employ
ment.

By the late 1920's and early 1930*s, the St.

Louis MAACP was beginning to become more energetic,
which was an indication of the aggressive nature it was
to assume by the mid 1930*s.

14Ibid..

June 29, 1928.

•*-5St. Louis Argus, May 24, 1929; October 4, 1929.
^Ibid., May 2, 1930; October 28, 1932.
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Perhaps the most significant development during the
1920*s was the change in leadership.

The national head

quarters had been, up to that time, largely controlled
and administered by whites.

During the 1920's, the organi

zation's leadership gradually changed in complexion from
17
white to black.

As this transformation took place at

the national office, the branches were also having a similar experience.

18

White St. Louisans played a significant role in the
St. Louis branch during the early years.

Whites were con

spicuous in the formation of the branch in 1914, in the
branch's efforts for anti-lynch legislation.
ticular Caucasians were valuable.

Three par

Roger N. Baldwin

helped organize the groups opposed to the segregation
ordinance of 1916.

Gustavus Tuckerman was active in

starting the branch, and he served as the first permanent

17Kellogg,

A History of the NAACP. 1909-1920. I, 291;
St. James, The National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, pp. 101-103; McMahon, "The Litigation of
the National Association," p. 23.
"^Kellogg, A History of the NAACP. I, 292-293.
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president from 1914 through 1916.

Rev. John Day was

active from the beginning, and he held the office of
president from 1917 through 1923.

Whites were selected

as presidents in order to lend prestige to the Associa
tion and because of their connections with the white com
munity.

For example. Rev. Day was the minister of the

Unitarian Church which included in its membership many
prominent St. Louisans.

The white presidents were

basically nominal officers who did not concern themselves
with the day-to-day affairs of the Association.

They

usually attended few meetings other than the annual meet
ing.1-^
From the branch's inception, the brunt of the work
was done by the black St. Louisans.

More often than not,

the Chairman of the Executive Committee ran the organi
zation in the early years.20
outstanding.

Three Negro chairmen were

Dr. T. A. Curtis was active from the begin

ning, and later became the first Negro president of the
branch.

Charles Pitman gave much time, energy, and money

"^Curtis Interview, August 6, 1968.
20ibia.
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to the branch, particularly during the fight against the
residential segregation law.

Attorney George L. Vaughn

served usefully, dividing his time between the NAACP, his
law practice, and local politics.

Although Vaughn and

Pitman never became presidents of the branch, some accounts
21
incorrectly remembered them serving in that capacity.
This is testimony to the fact that the Chairman of the
Executive Committee furnished most of the leadership in
the early years.

After the first black man became presi

dent, this process was reversed.

The presidents of the

local NAACP, thereafter, dominated the Association, not
only functioning as presiding officers, but as guides to
its everyday affairs.
There were many signs indicating the move towards
more black domination of the St. Louis NAACP.

Increas

ingly, the St. Louis Argus dwelled upon the ehair.oan
of the Executive Committee, and by 1922, the white presi
dent was scarcely mentioned.

Early in 1923, the branch

moved the office of the secretary into the building

21st. Louis Bicentennial corp., Negroes—Their Gift
to St. Louis, (Employees Loan Co.), 1964, pp. 37-39?
McKinney, interviews May 28, 1968 and August 5, 1968.
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occupied by the St. Louis Argus.22
the branch reached a new low.

Also during that year,

The membership campaign

could not be handled by the Association and had to be
23
organized by the City Federation of Women's Clubs.

The

branch was experiencing one of its periodic internal
battles and perhaps this explains the low ebb reached
24
that year.

The branch even postponed its elections in

order to give the candidate committee more time to find a
25
suitable person for president.

They finally selected

Dr. Thomas A. Curtis, a Negro who had served as the Chair
man of the Executive Board for 1923.
Dr. Curtis' life was an interesting one, but for our
purpose, he had two particular characteristics which were
shared by the vast majority of the branch's presidents.
He was born and educated outside of St. Louis, and secondly,
his occupation was a professional one.

Dr. Curtis was

Alabama's only Negro dentist when a confrontation with

22St.

Louis Argus. March 9, 1923.

23Ibid.,

April 13, 1923 April 20, 1923.

24The

Crisis. XXVI, (June, 1923), 66-67.

23The

St. Louis Argus. November 16, 1923.
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southern white violence, and southern officialdom's in-

26
difference caused him to move north in 1896.

Most of

the presidents to follow Curtis came from southern or
border states, and they probably sought by moving not only
to help themselves materially, but also to improve the
racial climate in which they lived.

Moving as they did,

implies that they were either aggressive or idealistic
or both.

These characteristics were in demand by an or

ganization such as the NAACP.

Almost all of the presi-

27
dents earned their living by a profession.

This was

important because it freed them, to a large degree, from
financial dependence upon the local white community.
To recapitulate, the 1920's were difficult years for
the St. Louis NAACP branch.

These were years when the

branch barely managed to survive the handicaps of internal
divisions, lack of guidance from the national office, and
the conservatism of the period.

2®Curtis

Given these disadvantages,

Interview, August 6, 1968. A Negro cotton
gin owner had had his gin burnt down by whites in the
vicinity of Montgomery, Alabama. Dr. Curtis was on a com
mittee that went to the Govenor of Alabama to ask for more
protection. The Govenor received them in a patronizing
manner and recommended that if they were good people, the
whites would treat them accordingly.
27Appendix,

#1.
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it was remarkable that the branch was able to survive the
white to black leadership change and still engage in some
defensive activity.

CHAPTER V

THE ESPY AND REDMOND ADMINISTRATIONS:
DEPRESSION AND WAR YEARS

Two factors, national guidance and keen branch leader
ship, merged during the depression and war years to produce
an impressive list of major accomplishments.

The central

characters in the St. Louis branch's new surge of energy
were Joseph E. Mitchell, Henry D. Espy, and Sidney R. Red
mond.

Espy and Redmond were lawyers who had come to St.

Louis in the late 1920*s.

They formed a partnership which

is still in existence today.
Henry D. Espy was brought up near the small town of
Gifford, Florida, where his father homesteaded 160 acres
of land.

He came to St. Louis after graduating from the

Howard University Law School.

Espy served as an officer

of various organizations a few of which were the Mound
City Bar Association, the Republican Party 6th Ward organ
ization, and the NAACP.

^"Henry D. Espy, Personal interview with author held
705 Chestnut, St. Louis, Mo., August 9, 1968.
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Sidney Redmond was raised in Jackson, Mississippi,
and he was graduated from the Harvard Law School.

After

settling in St. Louis, he became active in many different
organizations.

After a few years he was elected president

of the local Negro Bar Association.

Aside from his busy

law practice, he wrote "Legal Hints" in the St. Louis
Argus.
NAACP.^

As early as 1931, he served as counsel for the
Redmond was a member of the National Board dur

ing the late 1930"s and early 1940*s, and he served as
the State NAACP President.

One of his interests was

local Republican politics, and he held the offices of
Associate City Counselor and Alderman in St. Louis.4

2St.

Louis NAACP Branch. Minutes of the Meetings of
the Executive Board, January 26, 1949. There were two
bar associations in St. Louis before 1950; one having
only black members and the other having only white mem
bers. Redmond was refused admittance into the St. Louis
Bar Association (white) because of race in 1949. Black
lawyers usually belonged to the Mound City Bar Associa
tion.
^McMahon, "The Litigation of the National Associa
tion, " pp. 102-3. Redmond defended Tom Carraway of
Biloxi, Mississippi. The trial ended in 1934 when the
court sentenced Carraway to prison for life.
4Sidney

R. Redmond. Personal interviews with author
held 705 Chestnut, St. Louis, Mo., May 27, 1968 and Aug
ust 13, 1968. Redmond was a city alderman until the
mid 1950's.
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Henry Espy and Sidney Redmond provided much of the
leadership for the branch from 1934 to 1945 by serving
as presidents during these years.

They devoted the time

and energy necessary to turn the St. Louis NAACP into one
of the most active branches in the country.
portant was the fact that both were lawyers.

Equally im
This quali

fication proved indispensable, for most of the important
achievements of the St. Louis branch required minds ex
perienced in law.
The third man mentioned above was Joseph E. Mitchell.
Mitchell was elected as the president of the local NAACP
in 1933 and 1934.

He was a self-educated man who came to

5
St. Louis at the turn of the century.

In 1912 with the

backing of a fraternal insurance group, he started the St.
Louis Argus.

As early as the World War I he organized a

Negro political machine and became a power behind the

6

scene in local Republican politics.

Anyone reading the

St. Louis Argus during the pre-World War II era would

5
Curtis interview, August 6, 1968. Curtis remembered
helping Mitchell with his spelling and grammar.
^Herman Dreer, "Negro Leadership in Saint Louiss A
Study in Race Relations." (Unpublished Ph.D. disserta
tion), University of Chicago, September, 1955, pp. 97-100.
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have to agree with Mitchell when he wrote, "the Arcrus has
been the life blood of the local Branch of the NAACP dur-

7

ing the past twenty-five years."

From the very begin

ning, the St. Louis Argus provided the branch with pub
licity, an ingredient greatly needed by any volunteer or
ganization.
Circumstances helped bring about the emergence of
these leaders by the early 1930's.

The national office

was moving toward a more aggressive posture, and there
were many in the branch who felt this aggressiveness
should be duplicated locally.

This group wanted the

branch to take the offensive.

To achieve this, some felt

new leadership was needed while others felt President Cur
tis had held that office long enough.

Curtis agreed with

some of these opinions and attempted to step aside in
1931.8
A division in the branch developed over the selec
tion of the person to follow Curtis.

7St.

Q

Finally, Joseph E.

Louis Argus. May 7, 1937.

°Curtis Interview, August 6, 1968; Espy Interview,
August 9, 1968; Redmond Interviews, May 27, 1968 and
August 13, 1968.
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Mitchell won the presidency over Rev. E. R. Clark in

9
December, 1932.

Mitchell served one year, was elected

to another but asked Henry Espy to finish out his 1934
term because of failing health.1-^

Mitchell provided the

transition from the defensive-minded leaders of the 1920's
to the more aggressive legal-minded leadership provided
by Espy and Redmond.
The branch became involved in a variety of activities
during the 1930's and early 1940.

The branch's efforts

caused a removal of the signs "Negro" from the restrooms
at the railroad station.

In 1936, an essay contest on

Negro history was sponsored by the branch.

The branch

continued handling cases involving police brutality and
increased its effort in this direction.

The local NAACP was

active in about twenty-five cases of police brutality in

1941.

However, by 1944 the Association furnished counsel

^Curtis Interview, August 6, 1968; St. Louis Argus,
December 9, 1932.

lOEspy Interview, August 9, 1968.
U-St. Louis Argus, November 10, 1933? February 14,
1936.
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in only two cases.

The decrease proved to the branch the

effectiveness of their campaign.

12

On the political front, the branch was active under
the Espy and Redmond administrations,

in 1943 alone the

branch worked with Alderman Joseph C. Caston in drafting
a city ordinance prohibiting racial discrimination in
restaurants located on city-owned property? sponsored a
civil rights bill in the Missouri Legislature; and led
three delegations to Jefferson City in behalf of pending
legislation.

13

The St. Louis NAACP never developed a general program of job procurement during these years,
was done in specific areas.

14

but much

For example the branch ob

tained more and better jobs for Negroes in work projects

12St.

Louis NAACP Branch, Bulletin, 1940-41; 1944.
From 1933 through 1944, the branch printed these one page
flyers telling of its achievements for the preceding year.
The titles varied sometimes appearing as Branch Achieve
ments, Branch Accomplishments, or Branch Bulletin. They
will be referred throughout this paper as it appears in
this footnote.
13Ibid..

1943.

^Espy interview, August 9, 1968; Redmond interviews,
May 27, 1968; August 13, 1968.
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started by the federal government.15

partial success was

achieved in the St. Louis Post Office and the St. Louis
Police Department.

At the Post Office the branch secured

promotions for Negroes into four new departments where
they had previously been excluded.

The branch held con

ferences with the police board and the Govenor in order
to encourage the hiring of more black policemen.

More

were hired, but in 1944 the forty-six black policemen
made up only 3% of the total force.1*2
The branch opened a business office in 1935.

Mrs.

Ruth Roland Wheeler, the secretary of the branch, was in

charge of the office, and it was open from 11*00 a.m. to
2*00 p.m. on weekdays.17

The office space, telephone,

and often the secretarial help was provided by lawyers
Espy and Redmond.

18

During the war years of 1943 and

1944, the branch sent almost 600 telegrams and over 4,000

15
St. Louis NAACP Branch, Bulletin. 1938-39? St.
Louis Argus, February 14, 1936.
16Ibid?
17St.

1938-1944.

Louis Arcus, November 29, 1935.

•^Redmond Interviews,May 27, 1968 and August 13,
1968.
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letters pertaining to NAACP business out of Redmond
and Espy's office.

19

It was not an accident that the National NAACP Con
vention was held in St. Louis at the beginning of the
Henry Espy Administration.

Espy and Redmond attended

the 1934 National Convention seeking the convention for
St. Louis the following year.

They thought that holding

the convention in St, Louis would attract more members,
and it would act as a further stimulus for branch activi
ties.

The 1935 convention was held in St. Louis, and it

provided the branch with what the St. Louis NAACP leader
ship had planned for—publicity and stimulation.20
During the depression and war years, efforts were
made to develop regional organizations.

Herbert J.

Seligman of the national office started the plan in
21
1930.

The Kansas City NAACP branch organized the first

-^St. Louis NAACP Branch, Bulletin. 1943-1944.
20Espy

interview, August 9, 1968; St. Louis Argus.
July 19, 1935, Headline—"NAACP Had Rebirth at Meeting
Here."
21McMahon,

tion,"p. 37.

"The Litigation of the National Associa
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Missouri State Conference in 1931,

22

organization soon became dormant.

but the state-wide

It was not until 1940,

under the prodding of Sidney Redmond that the Missouri
State Association of Branches was revived.

Redmond

spoke in towns throughout Missouri to create interest in
the state organization and to "inspire" rural branches
towards action.

He served as the President of the State

Association during the war years, but because of limited
23
funds, it was "very inactive."
The primary concern of the branch during the Espy
and Redmond years was civil rights.

The Vashon High School

Suit was one of the successful cases handled by the St.
Louis NAACP.

In 1934 the branch joined with other groups

to protest the building of an elementary school on the
Vashon High School grounds.

St. Louis public Schools

were strictly segregated until the mid-1950's, and
Vashon was a Negro high school.

Large segments of the

22Robert

W. Bagnall, "NAACP Branch Activities,"
The Crisis, XL (June, 1931), 206.
23The

Crisis. XLVII (November, 1940), 360? St. Louis
NAACP Branch, Bulletin. 1940-1941.
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Negro community opposed the school board in the selec
tion of this site for the new Negro grade school.

The

NAACP, under Henry Espy's leadership, provided much of
the guidance and money in the fight against this school
site selection.

In order to put pressure on the school

board, the local NAACP opposed the 1934 school bond issue.
This led to some internal problems for the branch.

Many

members were St. Louis public school teachers, and they
felt compromised when the branch opposed the bond issue.
To resolve this apparent conflict of interest and to protect their jobs, many teachers resigned from the NAACP.

24

The bond issue passed, and the Negro leaders decided to
take the issue to court.

Lawyers George L. Vaughn,

Robert L. Witherspoon, and Sidney Redmond argued the
case.^5

Finally in December, 1937, Judge Robert J. Kirk-

wood decided that "the area there (Vashon High School
26
grounds) was already too small to whip a cat on,"

OA

Espy Interview, August 9, 1968; St. Louis Argus,
December 28, 1934. Robert P. Watts, Secretary of the
local, was one of many to resign, and the Argus questioned
his motives by asking, "Was it pressure or fright?"
25The

Crisis. XLV (January, 1938), 21.

26 Robert L. Witherspoon, Personal Interview with
author held 1518 Sarah, St. Louis, Mo., August 31, 1968.
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and he issued the permanent injunction sought by the NAACP
lawyers.
The branch's legal efforts proved unsuccessful in
another case arising during the mid-1930's.

A new muni

cipal auditorium for St. Louis was opened in 1934.

The

building was christened Kiel Auditorium after the Repub
lican Mayor of the World War I era.

At low-brow events

such as prize fights and political assemblies, there was
no problem of segregation.

However, when the Grand Opera

leased the Auditorium, a Negro public school teacher com
plained to one of St. Louis' leading Negro Democrats,
David Grant, that he could only buy a segregated seat.27
Joseph P. Harris, a lawyer, was chosen to be the plain
tiff in the case primarily because he was willing, and
he paid property taxes to support Kiel Auditorium.23
Harris attempted to buy tickets to the Grand Opera, and
found he would have to sit in the right or left side of
29
the balcony.' Numerous meetings were held between the

27
David M. Grant, personal interviews with author
held 705 Olive, St. Louis, Mo., June 1, 1968 and August 10,
1968.
23Espy

Interview, August 9, 1968.

29Harris

vs. City of St. Louis, III S.W. 2d 997,1938-
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city administration's representatives, Guy Golterman who
had licensed the building for the Grand Opera from the
city, and the Negro leadership.

After one meeting, the

following conversation was reported to have taken place
between Charles M. Hay, City Counselor and Joe Harris:
Hay:

"Joe, I don't know why you want to attend
the opera. All I do at the opera is sleep."

Harris: "Well Mr. Hay, I have as much right to
sleep there as you.n3°
The city officials held firm in their policy of allowing
the person leasing the building complete discretion on
admissions.

In order to placate the Negro leadership,

the Grand Opera liberalized its seating policy to allow
groups of seats to be sold to Negroes throughout the
Auditorium, but still on a segregated basis.

31

The pro

posal was unacceptable to the local NAACP, and prepara
tions were made for a more extensive battle.
The St. Louis NAACP fought on two fronts in its
attempt to force the city to discontinue its policy of

30Grant
31Ibid.;

Interviews, June 1, 1968, August 10, 1968.
Espy Interview, August 9, 1968.
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allowing segregation in Kiel Auditorium,

in 1935, the

Association opposed the Memorial 3ond issue in the hope
that the city officials would h^ve second thoughts.

The

branch President, Henry Espy, explained that this move was
a "retaliatory" gesture because of the restrictive use
32
of Kiel Auditorium.

This approach failed, for the city

administration did not change its position.
While the local NAACP fought the bond issue, court
action was also started.

The Association brought suit

in the St. Louis Circuit Court against the city of St.
Louis in 1934.

This venture failed and was then taken to

the St. Louis Court of Appeals.

The attorneys for appel

lant Joseph Harris were Henry Espy and Sidney Redmond.
It was Harris' position that the city did not have the
right to allow segregation.

His tax money helped pay for

the building of Kiel, and therefore, he ought to be ad
mitted the same as anyone else.

The city argued that

they were not the party who discriminated and that accord
ing to state law, the party leasing a building had the
right as a proprietor to set the conditions of admittance.
The court sided with the city, and the Missouri Supreme

32

St. Louis Argus. August 30, 1935.

72

Court declined to hear the case in 1938 because no Con33
stitutional issues were involved.
Failure in the courts did not end this controversy.
What had been sought by litigation was achieved without
court order.

Soon after the case was decided, the city

changed its position, and thereafter what segregation
34
occurred at Kiel Auditorium was on a voluntary basis.
During World War II, the branch membership, along
with the rest of the country, spent much time thinking
about military affairs.

The NAACP leadership was con

cerned about the Negro in the armed services.

Because

of the pressures brought by the branch, discriminatory
signs were removed at the local U.S. Medical Depot and
35
the Canteen at the Veterans Hospital."'"'
Up to World War II, Missouri had never sent a Negro
to West Point.
dition.

The branch set out to change this tra

In 1943 because of the efforts of Redmond,

Espy and others. Congressman L. E. Miller of St. Louis

33Harris

vs. City of St. Louis, III S.W. 2d 995-1000.

34
Grant Interviews, June 1, 1968, August 10, 1968;
Redmond Interviews, May 27, 1968, August 13, 1968.
^5St. Louis NAACP Branch, Bulletin. 1940-1944.
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nominated a Negro principal and Negro alternates to Wast
Point.

Congressman Miller, a Republican, had many friends

in the Negro community, and since he needed a large Negro

vote every two years, he was favorably disposed toward
granting this favor.

The outcome was the admission and

graduation from West Point of the first Negro from Mis36
souri.

No doubt this feat achieved by the St. Louis

NAACP was a point of pride for St. Louis Negroes, indeed
for all Missouri Negroes.
Some of the achievements of the Espy and Redmond
administrations had importance beyond the borders of Mis
souri.

Redmond and Espy served as toastmasters for the

Anniversary Club of St. Louis.

One responsibility of

the toastmaster was to obtain guest speakers for club
meetings.

The Mexican Consul stationed in St. Louis

spoke at one of the Anniversary Club meetings,

in var

ious conversations with the Mexican Consul, Redmond and
Espy pointed out the unfairness of requiring a $500

3^Ibid.,

1943; 1944. Charles L. Smith was the first
Negro from Missouri to enter West Point; Guy S. Ruffin.
Personal Interview with author held 3520 Laclede, St.
Louis, Mo., August 31, 1968. Smith was graduated and is
now an officer in the U.S. Army.

74

deposit from United States Negroes entering Mexico.

The

Mexican Consul agreed, and he wrote the officials in Mex37
ico.

In 1939 the branch received written assurance that

38
this policy would be discontinued.

This equalization of

treatment at the Mexican border served to illustrate how
with quiet consultation, the branch was able to achieve
some of its goals without public threats, political wire
pulling, or court action.
The St. Louis NAACP branch obtained some of its ob
jectives through thoughtful conversation with the right
people, but generally while Espy and Redmond provided the
leadership, the primary emphasis for change came through
the courts.
the NAACP.

The courts have been the favorite target for
It seemed only natural that once the NAACP

passed from the doldrums of the 1920's and decided to break
new ground, it would choose for its leaders, men skilled
in the area where change was sought.

Not only was more

37Letter,

Lie. Raul E. Valenzuela cons. Depto. Inf.
Consular Tlatelolco D.P. Mexico to Daniel Kelleher,
June 22, 1968. The consular service of Mexico claimed
that a legislative or administrative policy never existed
that required a deposit from Negroes entering Mexico.
^®Redmond Interviews, May 27, 1968, August 13, 1968;
The Crisis, XLVI (May, 1939), 149.
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aggressive leadership needed by the branch during the
depression and war years, but also leaders skillful in
law.

Sidney Redmond and Henry Espy filled these needs

most adequately as the many accomplishments of the 1930's
and early 1940's bear witness.

CHAPTER VI

THE ST. LOUIS NAACP BRANCH AND THE GAINES CASE

A few years before World War II, the Supreme Court
of the United States handed down a decision that was to
mark the turning point for segregated education.

The

high court's decision in the Gaines case forced the states
providing separate education for whites and Negroes to
re-evaluate that policy and to lend more than tacit sup
port to Negro education.

The decision formed the legal

bedrock for the desegregation decisions following World
War II in graduate level education, and it helped pro
vide the judicial atmosphere for the ordering of local
public schools desegregation in the mid-1950's.

This

case involving a young Negro from St. Louis and the Uni
versity of Missouri gained importance far surpassing its
local significance.

It provided the nation with an ans

wer to a pressing problem, and at the same time it
heightened the controversy revolving around state and
federal responsibility in the fields of education and
human rights.
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The Gaines Case was the first educational suit
sponsored by the NAACP to reach the Supreme Court.

The

case was successful due to the cooperation between the
NAACP and its St. Louis branch.

As usual, the stimula

tion and direction came from the national office.

Under

the leadership of Henry Espy and Sidney Redmond the
branch was willing and eager to take to the offensive.
The outcome was the accomplishment of the branch's most
notable contribution to the advancement of black people.
The Gaines Case, indeed the NAACP's entire attack on
segregated education, did not happen by chance.

It evolved

because of a plan and financial help from an outside source.
Nathan Margold, who managed the American Fund for Public
Service, counselled with the NAACP leaders.

In May, 1930

both parties agreed to a total sum of $100,000 to be pro
vided in periodic allotments for the financing of a legal
offensive against segregated schools.

Margold*s original

three part plan included concentration on the worst states;
forcing equality under a dual system in each state, thus
making it too costly to continue segregated education;
and focusing public attention on segregates education.1

^McMahon, "The Litigation of the National Associa
tion, " p. 18; Robert McLaren Sawyer, "The Gaines Case:
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The depression caused a shrinkage in the assets of
the American Fund, and it was 1934 before any money was
made available to the NAACP.

Ihe amount available was

reduced from $100,000 to $10,000 in that year, and ulti
mately, about $21,000 was contributed to the NAACP's
2
efforts to desegregate education.

The reduction in

funds caused not only a delay but a shift in the plan
of attack.

Charles H. Houston, vfao became the NAACP's

full-time special counsel in 1935, planned the new attack.
Houston's blueprint entailed the same basic idea as the
Margold plan.

The hope was to make it so costly to pro

vide a dual system of education that the states would
voluntarily desegregate, instead of a broad attack, how
ever, a pin point thrust was made on the graduate univer
sity level, and the worst areas were left for later as

Its Background and Influence on the University of Mis
souri and Lincoln University 1936-1950." (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Missouri University, January, 1966),
pp. 101-103; Thurgood Marshall, "An Evaluation of Recent
Efforts to Achieve Racial Integration in Education Through
Resort to the Courts," Journal of Negro Education, XXI
(Svimmer, 1952), 318.
2Sawyer,

"The Gaines Case," pp. 103-104; McMahon,
"The Litigation of the National," p. 20.
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3
precedents were sought in the border states.
The NAACP lost its first case in 1933 against the
4
University of North Carolina on technical grounds.
1935, the NAACP had a better record.

in

Defeat came in

Tennessee where a Negro was refused entrance into the
University of Tennessee on the technical point that ad
ministrative remedies had not been exhausted.

The suit

against the University of Kentucky ended in the establish
ment of a makeshift engineering course at a Negro college.5
Victory finally came when Donald Murray attempted to
enter the University of Maryland's law school.

The state

court of appeals ruled that out-of-state tuition paid by
the state to Negroes attending schools outside of Mary
land was discriminatory.

The court ordered Murray ad

mitted to the University Law School since no state
official was authorized to establish a new school for
Negroes.

This was a significant breakthrough for the

3

Marshall, "An Evaluation of Recent Efforts,"
pp. 317-318y St. Louis Arcrus. July 19, 1935; Charles H.
Houston, "Educational inequalities Must Go!", The Crisis,
XLII (October, 1935), 300-301.
4McMahon,

"The Litigation of the National," pp. 232235. The president of the Negro college refused to cer
tify the plaintiff's scholastic record.
5
Sawyer, "The Gaines Case," pp. 109-110.
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NAACP, and immediately plans were made to continue the
attack.

It was at this point that a request for legal

aid came from a St. Louis Negro.^
Lloyd L. Gaines was a lean handsome young man of
some twenty-three years when he asked for the aid of the
NAACP.

He was the youngest of five children brought by

their mother from Oxford, Mississippi, in 1926.

He

worked his way through high school and college, receiv
ing some additional financial help from scholarships and
his two older brothers.

He attended Stowe Teacher's Col

lege in St. Louis for a year, and then entered Lincoln
University in Jefferson City, Missouri.

On August 4,

1935, Gaines graduated from Lincoln as an honor student
and president of his class.'

A few days later, he

registered with the placement bureau at Lincoln.

Early

in June of that year, he received a University of Mis
souri catalog.

Gaines could not find a teaching position,

6Ibid.,

pp. 107-108; Harry S. Ashmore, The Negro
and the Schools. (Chapel Hill; University of North Caro
lina Press, 1954), pp. 31-32.
7Lucile

H. Bluford, "The Lloyd Gaines Story," The
Journal of Educational Sociology, XXXII (February, 1959),
242-243.
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and in August he again wrote the University of Missouri.
This time he filled out the application blank for the law
school, and at the same time he wrote the President of
Lincoln University asking that his transcripts be forwarded
to the University of Missouri.

In this letter, Gaines in

dicated that he knew his application had a special mean
ing.

He hoped that what he was doing would improve opporg

tunities for all Negroes.
It was not until the registrar received Gaines' tran
script that he knew Gaines was a Negro.

The month of

September passed with little accomplished except an ex
change of many letters between Gaines, the University of
Missouri, and Lincoln University.

It appeared that the

University of Missouri was not going to admit him? Lincoln
University did not have a law school? and his only reg
course was to apply for an out-of-state scholarship.
As Gaines was writing letters, he was also convers
ing with a St. Louis public school teacher who was active
in the St. Louis NAACP.

Zaid D. Lenoir suggested to Gaines

that he allow his name to be used by the NAACP in a law

8Sawyer,
9Ibid.,

"The Gaines Case", pp. 152, 155-157.
pp. 157-159.

82

suit.

Gaines contacted the branch's leaders in late

September and they in turn sent the request for legal
aid to the national office.10

It was not mere coincidence that Lloyd Gaines de
cided to apply to the all white University of Missouri.
The NAACP's successful suit against the University of
Maryland was well publicized and most educated Negroes
of Gaines* caliber were cognizant of the victory.

In

July, 1935, the NAACP held its national convention in
St. Louis.

At this convention, Charles Houston outlined

the attack which had started against the University of
Maryland.
ing.11

He made it clear that this was just the begin-

The NAACP had informed its branches that it would

finance a plaintiff fitting its needs, and the St. Louis
branch let it be known that it would like to see the
matter tested in Missouri.12

10Edward

T. Clayton, "The Strange Disappearance of
Lloyd Gaines," Ebony, VI (May, 1951), 31; Espy Interview,
August 9, 1968; Redmond Interviews, May 27, 1968;
August 13, 1968.

^St. Louis Argus. July 19, 1935.
12

Redmond interviews. May 27, 1968; August 13, 1968;
Houston, "Educational Inequalities Must GoJ", p. 300.
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The NAACP could not afford to spread itself thin.
It wanted the best possible plaintiff to achieve its
goal.

The Association had many requests for legal aid,

but it selected Gaines to accomplish its ends.
reasons for his selection were many.

The

Charles Houston

felt the need for Negro lawyers was critical if Negroes
were to achieve full equality.13

Gaines' excellent

scholastic record was a consideration.

The fact that he

was a product of Missouri's segregated schools lessened
the chance that the state would argue that he was not
qualified.

To argue along these lines would be to admit

the inequality of education provided Negroes in Mis
souri.14

Missouri had a policy of providing scholarships

which paid part of the tuition to those Negroes wishing
to do graduate or professional studies outside the state.
States throughout the nation were adopting this method

13Charles

H. Houston, "The Need for Negro Lawyers,"
The Journal of Negro Education. IV (January, 1935),
pp. 49-52.
l^Espy Interview, August 9, 1968.
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of "equalizing" education.15

The NAACP wanted to bring

this policy into question.16
The NAACP in behalf of Lloyd Gaines petitioned for
a writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court.

This forced

the official at the University of Missouri to either ad
mit Gaines or show cause why he could not enter the law
school.

By March, 1936, the University of Missouri de

cided to formally reject Gaines because Missouri law
would not pexrmit a person of African descent to enter
a white school. 17
Within three weeks, the NAACP petitioned the court
to force the University of Missouri to open its doors to
Gaines on the grounds that it was the only public law
school in Missouri.

The NAACP argued that state law and

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

150liver

C. Cox, "Provisions for Graduate Educa
tion Among Negroes and the Prospects of a New System,"
The Journal of Negro Education, XXX (January, 1940), 23.
Examples of states that passed out-of-state tuitions
Missouri, 1921; West Virginia, 1927; Oklahoma, 1935;
Maryland, 1935; Tennessee, 1936; and Texas, 1936.
16Leon

A. Ransom, "The Supreme Court Upholds Lloyd
Gaines," The American Teacher Magazine, XXIII (January,
1939), 15.

^Sawyer, "The Gaines Case", pp. 160-162.
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left the court with no other alternative than to order
the admission of Gaines to the University of Missouri.
Judge Dinwiddie of the Boone County Circuit Court set

18
July 10, 1936, for the hearing of oral arguments.
Almost 200 people, one-half of whom were black,
crowded the sultry courtroom on that day in July.

The

lawyers representing the University of Missouri argued
that it was public policy that required the separation
of the races.

They pointed out that under Missouri law,

Lincoln University was supposed tocpen new schools when
the need arose.

Until new schools were opened, the

practice of granting scholarships to black students for
graduate studies outside Missouri served to equalize
educational facilities.

Judge Dinwiddie was impressed

with this argument, and he denied Gaines entrance to the
University of Missouri.

The NAACP immediately filed an

i I9
appeal.
The appeal reached the Missouri Supreme Court in
December, 1937.

Sidney Redmond, Henry Espy, and Charles

Houston, the same lawyers who represented Gaines in the

18Ibid.,

p. 162.

^ibid., pp. 162-163.
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circuit court, handled the cases before the Missouri Sup
reme Court.
stated.

The arguments used by the NAACP were clearly

The out-of-state scholarships were brandedi

...a compromise and subterfuge, all the more
inadequate because the very essence of them is
to withhold from a Negro citizen because of
race, the joy and pride of studying at home in
a state university which he helps to support.
To counteract the state's contention that there was not
enough demand for a law school at Lincoln, it was pointed
out that Gaines' rights did not depend upon numbers, but
21
rather on his rights as an individual.

The heart of the matter was the argument that the
out-of-state scholarships were of a temporary nature until
Lincoln University could provide new schools.

In an

attempt to make light of this contention, the NAACP law
yers said:
If relator (Gaines) had the power to command
the sun to stand still and to order time to pause
in its flight, he might be able to wait that un
certain date when a law course might be inaugurat22
ed at Lincoln University....

20Gaines

Appellant vs. Canada. Brief for Appellee
at 61. Prepared by Sidney Redmond, Henry Espy, and
Charles Houston for the Supreme Court of Missouri, May
Term, 1937, #35, 386.
2•'•Ibid..

p. 56.

22
Ibid., p. 50.
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The Missouri Supreme Court sided with the lower court's
opinion in rejecting the arguments presented in behalf of
Gaines.

To them, Missouri law had a clear intention, and

that was to keep Negroes and whites separated for the purpose of education.21

The NAACP lawyers used the Pearson

vs. Murray Case as precedent, but the court found that
there were basic differences between higher education pro
vided Negroes in Missouri and Maryland.

For example, in

Maryland no official was authorized by law to establish
separate schools, but in Missouri, this was the respon
sibility of the Board of Curators of Lincoln University.
Also Maryland's out-of-state scholarship plan was not so
liberal as that provided by Missouri.24

To the members

of the Missouri Supreme Court, the state was not depriv
ing Gaines of due process of law under the 14th Amend
ment.

They pointed out the 14th Amendment provided for

equal not identical privileges and rights.

Thus Missouri's

provisions for higher education for Negroes were found
2^
"substantially equal" to that provided for whites.

23Gaines vs. Canada, 113 S.W. 2d, 786-787.
24Ibid..

791.

25Ibid.,

pp. 788-790.
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While the battle in the courts continued, there was
close cooperation between the national office and its
local chapter in St. Louis.

Charles Houston made the

general plans for the case.

He and Sidney Redmond handled

the oral arguments in court.

All three lawyers, Redmond,

Houston, and Espy, helped in the research and the taking
of depositions with Redmond and Espy doing most of the
work on the local level.

It is hard to appreciate in

1969 the hardships and chances Espy and Redmond took in
the mid-1930's.

The hardships involved financial sacri

fices and traveling inconveniences, but more important was
the threat of losing their professional status.

The law

yers for the University of Missouri took statements try
ing to prove Espy and Redmond were soliciting business.
If this charge had been proved, they would have stood in
peril of disbarment.

26

Despite this disquieting threat,

Redmond and Espy persevered and there was never a formal
charge.
The NAACP was able to take large numbers of cases to
court because the lawyers usually donated their services.

27

2®Espy

Interview, August 9, 1968? Redmond Interviews,
May 27, 1968, August 13, 1968.
27

McMahon, "The Litigation of the National...", p. 32.
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This tradition was upheld during the Gaines Case.
was needed, however, for expenses.

Money

The national office

paid Houston's expenses, and they also paid Gaines so he
could go to school in Michigan.

The national provided

Redmond expense money for his trip to Washington, D. C.
where he joined Houston for argumentation before the
Supreme Court.

The branch paid all other expenses in-

28
curred by Redmond and Espy.
It was early in November, 1938, when Redmond made
the trip to Washington, D. C.

The Supreme Court heard

the oral presentations from both sides on November 9.
On that day, the lawyers for the University of Missouri
were embarassed several times, for the questions from the
bench frequently forced them to correct overstatements on
29
Missouri's generosity to Negro education.
On December 12, 1938, the Supreme Court in a 5 to 2
decision found in favor of Gaines.

Chief Justice Hughes,

28Espy

Interview, August 9, 1968; Redmond Inter
views, May 27, 1968, August 13, 1968.
29

"Says University of Missouri Belongs to Whites,"
The Crisis. XLV (December, 1938), 399.
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speaking for the majority, agreed with all the basic
arguments of the NAACPt
Here, petitioner's
Gaines__/ right was a
personal one. It was as an individual that he
was entitled to the equal protection of the laws,
and the state was bound to furnish him within its
borders facilities for legal education substan
tially equal to those which the state there afford
ed for persons of the white race, whether or not
other Negroes sought the same opportunity."*0
The court was saying that out-of-state scholarships were
not providing equal treatment under the meaning of the
14th Amendment.

Another important feature of this rul

ing, as shown by the quotation, was that Gaines' right to
education was a personal one.

This would, in effect,

force Missouri and other states to establish expensive
schools for a few Negroes within each state.

This was

in accord with the NAACP's plan, for it was thought that
faced with this overwhelming expense the states would
then desegregate their schools.
Justice McReynolds wrote the dissenting opinion
which undoubtedly reflected more closely the feeling of
most whites in the 1930's.

30Gaines

He questioned the intentions

vs. Canada, 305 U.S. 351.
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of Gaines and saw only undesirable alternatives for Mis
souri under the majority's opinion.

The University of

Missouri would have to abandon her law school "...or...
break down the settled practice concerning separate schools,
and thereby, as indicated by experience, damnify both
races."31

McReynolds saw the long run effect of this de

cision, and what he saw, he did not savor.
In the short run, the decision was not as sweeping as
might have been expected.

Although, it reversed the Mis

souri Supreme Court, the case was sent back to that court
with instructions that Gaines be admitted to Missouri Uni
versity in the absence of other provisions which would
32
provide him equal treatment within the state.

In other

words, the final decision of admitting Gaines to the Uni
versity of Missouri or setting up a segregated school was
left up to the authorities in Missouri.
Reaction to the historic Gaines decision was predict
able.

In general, the newspapers of the North viewed it

31Ibid.,

p. 353.

32Ibid.,

p. 352.
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as a "great step forward," and the newspapers of the
33
South were less than enthusiastic.

The law reviews

reflected this same difference of opinion.

The Univer

sity of Chicago Law Review reported "...the instant de
cision represents a bold and laudable affirmation of

34
Negro rights."

On the other hand, a voice from the

South expressed the following hostile reaction:

"The

opinion of the dissenting justices seems to be the better
35
view as a fair effort to solve a difficult problem..."

Within the informed circles of white America, the re
action to the Gaines decision ranged from applause to
mild criticism.
The black community received the news of the Gaines
decision with guarded optimism.

Walter White, the Exe

cutive Secretary of the NAACP, declared the decision
"more sweeping" than was hoped, but he added that there
was a long struggle ahead to get the states to obey the

33

Sawyer, "The Gaines Case", pp. 248-251.

"*^"The Gaines Case," University of Chicago Law Re
view, VI (February, 1939), 305.
35Claude

L. Goza, "Admission of Negro to Law School
of the State University," Georgia Bar Journal. I (May,
1939), 54.
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36
court's mandate.

W» E. B. DuBois was optimistic that

Missouri would open the doors of the University of Mis
souri to Gaines.

He felt Missouri had proved herself an

"enlightened and progressive state," and hoped she would
not disappoint the Nation.

37

The Crisis characterized

the decision: "...as the most significant victory for
Negro rights in the highest court of the land in the past

38
decade."

The article went on to say that the Gaines

Case was just the beginning for this type of litigation.
Most authorities agreed that Missouri was not yet
ready for desegregation, and the Missouri legislature
proved them correct.

During the first few months of 1939,

the legislature worked out its answer to the Supreme
Court's decision.

Although more than 200 black people

attended the hearings in opposition to the Taylor Bill,
it became law by May, 1939.

35"Darani£y

39

The new law made it mandatory

Both Races," Time, XXXII (December 26,

1938), 20.

E. B. DuBois, "The Gaines Decision," The
Commonwea1. XXIX (January 6, 1939), 282.
37William

33"University

of Missouri Case Won," The Crisis. XLVI
(January, 1939), 10.
39St.

Louis Argus, April 14, 1939, Lawyer David M.
Grant acted as Chairman of the delegation and presented the
speakers opposing the bill.
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for the Board of Curators at Lincoln University to set up
new schools when the need arose, and $200,000 was appro40
priated to provide a law school for Negroes in Missouri.
By the summer of 1939, the NAACP lawyers found them
selves back where they had started.

The Missouri Supreme

Court sent the case to the circuit court for a jury trial
to decide if the newly created law school set up by the
Missouri Legislature proved equal to that of the Uni
versity of Missouri's Law School.

If the facilities

proved unequal, Gaines was to be admitted to the law
school at the University of Missouri.41

On October 11,

1939, the NAACP lawyers informed Judge Dinwiddie that
their client was missing.

By January, 1940, on the

strength of the fact that the plaintiff was still missa

ing, the Gaines case came to an end.

40
Norval Banksdale, "The Gaines Case and Its Effect
on Negro Education in Missouri," School and Society, LI
(March 9, 1940), 310-311; Sawyer, "The Gaines case,"
pp. 188-189. Previously, the Board of Curators had only
discretionary power to establish new schools at Lincoln
University.
41Gaines
42Sawyer,

vs. Canada, 131 S.W. 2d, 219-220.
"The Gaines Case," pp. 190-191.
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The NAACP never had a chance to test the equality
of the two public law schools of Missouri.

With the

financial help of his family and the NAACP, Gaines grad
uated from the University of Michigan with an M.A. degree
in economics.

He worked for a time as a W.P.A. clerk in

the Michigan State Civil Service Department.

Then he

came back to St. Louis and worked at a service station.
Gaines told friends as late as December, 1938, that he
expected to enter the University of Missouri Law School

43
by the fall of 1939.

Redmond and Espy helped Gaines

while the trial continued.

From time to time they paid

44
for his room at the TJMCA.
He left St. Louis in the spring to speak in Kansas
City, and from there, he went to find work in Chicago.
After almost three years of court cases, Gaines tired of
being the sacrificial lamb.

His idealism waned as the

following letter to his mother indicated:
I have found that my race still likes to
applaud, shake hands, pat me on the back, and
say how great and noble is the idea? how his
torical and socially important the case, but—
and there it ends.'"
43Bluford,

"The Lloyd Gaines Story," p. 243.

44Clayton,

"The Strange Disappearance...," pp. 32-33.

45Ibid.,

pp. 29-30. This letter was dated March 3,
1939, and was shown to Clayton by Gaines* mother.
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A dejected Lloyd Gaines stayed in Chicago for a time, and
then one night he left his room at the Alpha Phi Alpha
fraternity house and was never heard from again.46
The explanations for his disappearance ranged from
foul play to a financial settlement, but all such reasons
were based only on rumor.

When Charles Houston showed up

in St. Louis to carry on the court battle in October,
1939, the NAACP thought they had a client.

They soon

found that Gaines had been missing for some months.
panicked search led nowhere.

A

Pictures were carried in

the nation's newspapers and appeals went out, but the
NAACP was unable to locate Gaines.

Even the Selective

Service System during World War II was unable to discover
A*1

his whereabouts.

To this day, Gaines* disappearance

remains an enigma.
No sooner had Lloyd Gaines dropped from sight than
a new crusader took his place.

Lucile Bluford began a

struggle to enter the University of Missouri's School of
Journalism.

Several times, she went in person to the

46Ibid..

p. 26.

47Bluford,

"The Lloyd Gaines Story," p. 246.
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Registrar's office only to be told that Lincoln Univer
sity was responsible for higher education of Negroes in
Missouri.

When the Gaines Case was dropped, the NAACP

turned to Miss Bluford as the means to crack the door at
the University of Missouri, and in this sense, the Blu
ford Case was an extension of the Gaines Case.
Bluford was brought up in Kansas City, Missouri.

She

attended the University of Kansas and graduated in 1932
with a degree in journalism.

The State of Missouri paid

part of her tuition during her college years under the
out-of-state scholarship plan.

After working briefly

for the Atlanta Daily World, she obtained a job with the
Kansas City Call in 1932.

Starting in 1937, Bluford be

came Managing Editor of that Negro newspaper.

Encouraged

by the Gaines decision and the advice of the NAACP, both
local and national, she tried to enroll at the University
43
of Missouri during the winter of 1938-1939.

AD

Bluford vs. Canada. Brief for Appellee at 4,
9, 20. Prepared by Attorneys Sidney Redmond, Henry Espy,
John H. David, and Charles Houston for the Supreme Court
of Missouri, May Term, 1941, #37449. Dorothy Davis, "She
Knocks at the Door of Missouri University," The Crisis. XLVI
(May, 1940), 140.
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The Bluford case again revealed the spirit of co
operation between the St. Louis branch and the national
office.

The same lawyers who worked on the Gaines Case

also handled the Bluford suit.

There were many reasons

why the St. Louis branch took the case over the Kansas
City branch.

The St. Louis NAACP was more active, and

it was in a better financial position.

Redmond and Espy

had the Gaines experience behind them, and they were
eager to make up for the sad conclusion experienced in
that case.

Houston preferred working with Redmond and

Espy because of the experience factor.

Bluford, who had

reported the progress of the Gaines Case in the Kansas
City Call, knew Redmond personally.49
Even before the Gaines Case was formally closed, the
NAACP lawyers moved quickly with this new attack.

In Oc

tober, 1939, litigation was started in the state courts,
and by July, 1940, the case rested before the Missouri
Supreme Court.

The high court decided the state had

until February, 1941 to establish the necessary courses
at Lincoln or admit Bluford to the University of Missouri.

49Redmond

Interviews, May 27, 1968, August 13, 1968;
Espy interview, August 9, 1968.
50Bluford

vs. Canada, 153 S.W. 2d, 17, 18.
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At the same time Bluford was seeking a writ of man
damus in the state courts against the University of Mis
souri, the NAACP lawyers, filed a civil damage suit in
the federal district court.

A civil rights law of 1870

provided that a person depriving another of rights secured
by the Constitution could be held liable in the courts for
redress.

Under this law, Bluford sued Registrar Canada

of the University of Missouri for $10,009.
found that the: "...plaintiff

The court

Bluford^/ may not com

plain that the defendant /_ Canada__/ has deprived her of
her Constitutional rights until she has appJied to the
proper authorities for those rights and has been unlaw-

51

fully refused."

The court was indicating that perhaps

she would have had a case if she were suing the Lincoln
University Registrar.

The federal court proved to be no

more receptive than the state courts.
The immediate result for Missouri from the litiga
tion of both the Gaines and Bluford cases was the estab
lishment of two new Jim Crow schools.

The Lincoln Uni

versity Law School opened in the fall of 1939 over ths

51Bluford

vs. Canada, 32 Fed. Sup. 711.
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protest of pickets carrying placards.52

The school was

located in St. Louis, and it operated until 1943.

Some

of its graduates were admitted to the Bar.53
Starting in 1941, graduate courses in journalism
were offered at Lincoln University.

The school included

an attractive building, adequate library, good print
shop, and an excellent faculty.

Teachers from the Uni

versity of Missouri provided the instruction by driving
to Jefferson City.

By 1945 a Negro faculty was added to

54
the new school.
These schools were opened because of the efforts of
the NAACP, Lloyd Gaines, and Lucile Bluford.

Gaines and

Bluford, however, never attended the schools created for
their expressed needs.

Gaines mysteriously disappeared.

Bluford felt she had more experience than the new school
could offer, and her basic motive for her suit was to
open the University of Missouri.

52
Carey McWilliams, "Racial Dialectic: Missouri
Style," The Nation. CLX (February 24, 1945), 209.
53Ibid..

pp. 208-209.

54Ibid..

p. 209.
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The Bluford suite brought to an end the NAACP's con
centrated effort to open the professional schools for
Negroes in Missouri.
effort.

War diverted interest away from this

The NAACP had carried on the drive for six years,

and the finances of the Association would not permit it
to spend more of its already insufficient funds on the
55
seemingly impregnable segregation policies of Missouri.
After World War II, the NAACP decided to attack
segregated education head-on.

It became apparent that

the states would continue to evade the Gaines mandate by
setting up segregated schools.

Starting in 1947, the

NAACP devised a program to demolish the entire structure
of segregated education.
This new offensive started with state professional
and graduate schools.

All of the cases undermining segre

gation in higher education depended heavily upon the
c7
Gaines decision.

By 1949, the NAACP's efforts in

^Marshall, "An Evaluation of Recent Efforts...",
p. 318; McMahon, "The Litigation of the National...",
p. 249.
56NAACP

Annual Report. New York, 1947, pp. 22-23.

J/Ashmore,

The Negro and the Schools, p. 32; Frank
P. Graham, and Benjamin E. Mays, "Segregation and the
Schools," Public Affairs Pamphlet, #209, New York: NAACP,
N.d., p. 9.

102

Oklahoma and Texas were successful, for the highest court
in the land, in effect, over-ruled the "separate but
CO

equal" doctrine for professional schools.
Missouri was moving away from segregated graduate
education by the late 1940's. In 1949, Missouri's House
of Representatives passed a bill allowing Negroes to en
ter the University of Missouri if the courses it offered
were not available at Lincoln University. This bill was
blocked in the Senate, however, because of the Fairgrounds
Park Incident59 and the maneuvering of Senator Edward V.
Long.60
The Board of Curators of the University of Missouri
hoped this bill would pass, and when it did not, they
decided to act. One Board member contacted the St. Louis
NAACP and indicated that the time was right to file an
other suit.

Three black students were selected, and then

58Jessie

P. Guzman, Twenty Years of Court Decisions
Affecting Higher Education in the South. 1938-1958, (Tuskegee Institute Press, June, 1960), pp. 12-13? Albert P.
Blaustein and Clyde Ferguson, Jr., Desegregation and the
Law; The Meaning and Effect of the School Segregation
Cases, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press,
1947), pp. 109-110.
59See

Chapter VII.

6°Sawyer, "The Gaines Case", pp. 324-327.
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they filed for admittance to the engineering and grad
uate schools at the University of Missouri.

The case was

taken to Judge Sam C. Blair's Cole County Circuit Court
because both parties thought Judge Blair more sympathetic
61
than the judge serving in Columbia.
In March, 1950, the University of Missouri asked for
a judicial determination in the case,

in other words, the

University of Missouri's officials asked that the ruling
be given in general terms.

This type of ruling would do

away with the need for future suits.

Judge Blair did not

frustrate the consenting sides, for he ruled that Negroes
could not be excluded from the University of Missouri be
cause of race if the courses they wanted were not offered

62

at Lincoln University.

The University of Missouri did

not appeal the ruling, and in the fall of 1950, the school
received its first black students.

The St. Louis NAACP

branch bore the financial burdens incurred in this case.
The branch also financed, in part, the educational

61

Espy interview, August 9, I960.

62
Sawyer, "The Gaines Case", pp. 327-330.
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expenses of the three black students during their first
63
year at the University of Missouri.
With the admittance of these black students to the
University of Missouri, the branch achieved in an anticlimactic fashion the goal first sought in the Gaines Case.
The success experienced with the Gaines case was due to
the close cooperation between the NAACP and its branch in
St. Louis.

The national furnished the stimulus, and the

branch eagerly became active in the new offensive.

The

Gaines decision proved to be the most important contribu
tion of the St. Louis branch to the advancement of black
Americans.

The decision had towering importance for the

entire country, for it supplied the legal basis for the
desegregation of professional and graduate facilities in
several border and southwestern states after World War II.
In the long run, the importance of the Gaines Case cannot

63
Witherspoon, Interview, August 12, 1968; Letter,
Henry Espy to St. Louis NAACP, December 21, 1950, St.
Louis NAACP Branch Piles. This bill was submitted to the
branch by the Redmond and Espy law firm for services
amounting to $1520 for the Bell, Horne, and Rigdel vs.
University of Missouri Case. This bill gives one an idea
of the expenses encountered by the branch.
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be limited to higher education.

Given hindsight, it is

easy to conclude that the Gaines Case was the first major
break in the wall of segregated education.

Once each

state was forced to provide truly "separate but equal"
schools, it soon became apparent that this was an impos
sible task.

From that point, it was a relatively small

step for the Supreme Court in 1954 to conclude that segre
gated education was "inherently unequal."

CHAPTER VII

THE POST WAR YEARS:

1945-1955

Usually the meetings of the St. Louis NAACP were
held at the Pine Street YMCA.

This was not the case for

the November, 1944, membership meeting, whose chief busi
ness was to elect the president for the following year.
Militant members led by Henry Wheeler had changed the
location for this particular meeting to the Carr Square
Village Housing Project Meeting Hall.

The maneuver was

designed to make it easier to get their supporters to
the meeting.

The militants elected David Grant presi

dent for 1945,1 thus ending the six-year term of Sidney
Redmond.

By the spring of 1945, the changeover in

leadership was completed and the office of the branch
business secretary was moved adjacent to the law office
of David Grant.2

iRedmond

Interviews, May 27, 1968; August 13, 1968;
Grant Interviews, June i, 1968; August 10, 1968.
^St. Louis Argus, November 10, 1944; April 27, 1945.
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Grant, like Redmond, was highly articulate, out
spoken, and energetic.

Style and political philosophy

separated these two men.
sation.

Redmond was serious in conver

Grant, on the other hand, was apt to interject

a humorous or risque illustration to get his point across.
Redmond was a life-long Republican, while Grant was a mem
ber of the Democratic party since the 1930's.
David Grant was a native St. Louisan.
his law degree from Howard University.

He obtained

Under Democratic

dominated city administrations he held the offices of
Associate City Counselor, Assistant Circuit Attorney, and
Research Director for the Board of Aldermen,

in 1939, he

was arrested while leading demonstrators who were picket
ing the Jim Crow Law School in St. Louis established by
Lincoln University.

The year 1942 found Grant actively

engaged with Theodore D. McNeal, president of the St.
Louis Sleeping Car Porters Union, in organizing the March
on Washington in St. Louis.

The March on Washington Organ

ization arranged a demonstration outside the St. Louis
Small Arms Plant.

Following the demonstration, McNeal

and Grant negotiated with the plant management demanding
jobs for Negroes.

Soon these demands were met by the
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opening of a separate building which employed

Negroes.^

Grant was the first Democrat to become president of
the St. Louis NAACP.

During the 1930's, he claimed he

was not an active member of the NAACP because he was a
Democrat.

It was thought by many St. Louis Negroes as

late as the 1940's that being a Democrat was the equiva
lent of being disloyal to one's race.

Grant was always

forced to defend himself at NAACP meetings, and therefore,
he dropped out as an active member.4

In 1943, he gained

some distinction by working with Thurgood Marshall in a
case that equalized the salary for Missouri Negro teachers
with that of white teachers.^

At this point. Grant's

popularity began to rise among the middle-class Negroes.

3
Grant Interviews, June 1, 1968, August 10, 1968?
The Booker T. Washington Trading Stamp Association. "Metro
politan St. Louis: Negro Directory: A Classified Publica
tion of Biographies," St. Louis, 1943, p. 19. The March
on Washington was conceived by A. Phillip Randolph of the
National Sleeping Car Porters Union. It was organized to
march 10,000 protestors on Washington, D. C. if the Fed
eral Government would not open defense jobs to Negroes.
President Roosevelt issued an executive order which mado
the planned march unnecessary.
4
Grant Interviews, June 1, 1968, August 10, 1968.
5St.

Louis Argus. August 20, 1943.
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It was over the relatively small matter of advice
given to department store demonstrators that Grant came
to the forefront as a candidate for the president of the
branch.

As early as 1933, the NAACP local had protested

the discriminatory practices in the cafeterias of the
leading department stores.

Although not under the spon

sorship of the NAACP, many members participated in sitins and demonstrations in 1944, which were under the direction of Theodore McNeal.

Representatives of the stores

threatened the demonstrators with arrest for trespassing.
Henry Wheeler and some other active NAACP members sought
the advice of Sidney Redmond.

Redmond advised that "there

was at least a strong liklihood that they would be arrest7
ed."

Dissatisfied with this advice, Wheeler and his

group went to David Grant.

Grant told Wheeler that as

long as there was no destruction of property, they would
probably not be arrested.

His opinion was based on the

\

premise that the stores would not act because they feared

^Ibid.« November 10, 1933; St. Louis Globe-Democrat,
July 9, 1944.
7Redmond

Interviews, May 27, 1968, August 13, 1968.
Redmond disapproved of the demonstrators' using children,
for if they were arrested they would have that mark for
life.
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adverse publicity. Mayor Kaufmann had recently declared
Pruitt Day in honor of the World War II Negro Air Force
pilot from St. Louis. Grant reasoned that the stores
would not want to bring attention to the fact that they
were discriminating against the race that had just had
one of its members honored by the city. This advice
proved correct, for the demonstrators were not arrested,
and their efforts were rewarded by some desegregation of
store cafeteria facilities.8
On the strength of the advice given to the militant
members of the NAACP, Grant was approached about the
presidency.

After Theodore McNeal encouraged him to

accept this offer. Grant told the group that he would
accept the position if elected.

Q

Probably one of the

chief motives for Grant's candidacy was a desire on the
part of McNeal and Grant to give more prestige to their
party by obtaining the leadership of the NAACP.

Up to

this time, it had always been held by leading Republicans.

8

Grant Interviews, June 1, 1968; August 10, 1968.
g
Theodore McNeal was on the Executive Board
the St. Louis NAACP, and he was a leading Negro Demo
crat and labor union leader.

Ill

Whatever the motive, Grant was elected at the housing
project meeting, and he took office early in 1945.
The Republican and Democratic parties were stereo
typed on the issue of economics.

Many saw the Democratic

party as "big spenders" and the Republicans as "misers."
Grant and Redmond, acted out these exaggerated roles.
One of the last acts of the Redmond administration was
to put several thousand dollars of the branch's funds
into U. S. Government Savings Bonds which could not be
cashed for a six-month period.

This action reflected

Redmond's fear that the Grant administration would be
less than thrifty.

Grant proved Redmond correct, for

by the end of 1947, the branch had little in the way of
surplus funds.

Grant believed that the branch needed

liquidity and not investments.

It was his feeling that

the funds could serve a better purpose by being used in
the work of the NAACP.

Another shift in policy was the

de-emphasis of volunteer work.

Paying people for their

services was thought by Grant a much better policy than
the unreliable method of volunteer work.3"3"

10Ibid7

This new

Redmond interviews, May 27, 1968, August 13,

1968.
^Grant Interviews, June I, 1968, August 10, 1968.
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policy, no doubt, cut into the reserve fund accumulated
during the Redmond years.
One innovation in the postwar years was the hiring
of an executive secretary for the St. Louis NAACP.

This

was part of the change sought by Grant of relying more on
paid workers as opposed to volunteer help.

The innovation

may have solved some problems, but it also created a new
one.

Throughout the postwar era, the branch was forced

to define the role of the executive secretary.

The exe

cutive secretary found her job difficult because her re
sponsibility and authority were not clear.

It was hard

to please everyone in the branch because everyone had a
12
different idea as to what this new position entailed.
The first executive secretary faced this handicap, and
in the spring of 1948, the executive board of the branch,
over the protest of the president, voted to terminate
her services.

Objections to the caliber of her work and

l^witherspoon Interview, August 12, 1968; Hubert
L. Brown, Personal interview with author held 4515 Holly
Pi., St. Louis, Mo., August 14, 1968.

113

the financial condition of the branch were the reasons
13
for this action.
It had become common practice for the branch to ask
the NAACP for a field worker to organize their membership
campaigns.

Ihe branch was expected to pay for this help.

instead of following this procedure, the branch decided
to hire someone from within the branch.

Mrs. Stella B.

Price was hired at $100 per month to conduct the 1949m3m14
bership campaign.

By the spring of 1949, Mrs. Price

was ready to resign because she felt "...handicapped by
an uncooperative attitude of some of the officers and
15
members of the board."

Some groups felt the paid

worker was infringing upon their fields of authority.
In addition to the difficult problem of defining
the authority of their paid workers, the branch also had

13
St. Louxs NAACP Branch, Minutes of the Executive
Board Meetings, April 17, 1948; May 29, 1948. (Type
written), St. Louis NAACP Piles. As a protest to this
action, Mrs. J. Claybourne Bush, the secretary of the
branch, resigned.
14
Ibid., January 9, 1948.
15Ibid.,

May 14, 1959; Letter, Stella B. Price, Bus
iness Secretary of Branch, to President Pettigrew, July 1,
1949, St. Louis NAACP Files. She asked in this letter to
be released from her duties because she found it impossible
to continue.
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to contend with the possible infiltration of their organ
ization by subversive groups.

It was known that the Com

munist party had adopted the policy of capturing branches
in order to exert an influence on the NAACP.

16

During

the Grant and Ruffin administrations, some attempts were
made in this direction.

The FBI was continually checking

various individual branch members.

Some members worked

17
as "dupes," ' and some of the leaders of the branch were
18
approached to take out membership in the Community party.
All the branch's leaders agreed, however, that a communist
never gained a position of leadership in the branch and
some believed it only a "red herring."-'-9

The branch was

very careful, perhaps to the point of over reaction, in
the selection of its leaders.

For example, in 1950

Mrs. Valla Abbrington was nominated for the executive

l®Wilso» Record, The Negro and the Communist Party.
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1951)
pp. 147, 182, 265-268.
17
Grant interviews, June 1, 1969; August 10, 1968.
Unfortunately specific information on this topic was un
obtainable.
laRuffin

interview, August 31, 1968.

•^Brown Interview, August 14, 1968; Witherspoon In
terview, August 12, 1968.
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board.

It was pointed out that she was an official in

the Social and Office Workers Union, which had been ex
pelled by the CIO as subversive.

This objection to her

appointment kept her off the board until the "charges

20
were proven unfounded."

The leadership of the St.

Louis NAACP did not want to compound their problems of
being black by also becoming "Red."
One of the chief characteristics of the St. Louis
NAACP during the postwar period was increased factional
ism and constant internal dissension.

Heated disagree

ments developed before the end of Grant's administration.
The very group that had elected Grant turned on him after
he was elected.

The militants, led by Henry Wheeler and

Joseph Clark, continually attacked him at meetings, and
more than once Grant and these members almost came to
blows.21
The national office showed some concern over the
branch's internal difficulties.

The branch voted to

2c^St.

Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes of the Executive
Board Meetings, June 3, 1950; September 11, 1950, (Type
written), St. Louis NAACP Files.
Interview, August 31, 1968? Grant Inter
views, June 1, 1968, August 10, 1968.
21Ruffin
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accept a worker from the national office because that
office felt the branch "needed stimulation."

22

The re

port of the NAACP's worker, Daniel E. Byrd, listed many
causes for the branch's difficulties, but the conclusion
pinpointed the chief problem: "I am convinced that segre
gation can be eliminated in St. Louis if some semblance
23
of unity is forthcoming from the Negroes."

From the

national office's point of view, the branch had to limit
its schismatic tendencies before a successful program
could be achieved.
The internal splits that developed in the St. Louis
NAACP in the postwar era were very obvious, but the rea
sons for this phenomenon were more obscure.

In Chapter IV,

it was pointed out that in the 1920's the St. Louis NAACP
had similar difficulties.

In both periods there was a

major shift in leadership; in the 1920's from white to
black and in the mid 1940's from Republican to Democratic.
The conflict between Republicans and Democrats, at least

22St.

Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes cf the Executive
Board Meeting, June 20, 1949. Special meeting, (type
written) St. Louis NAACP Files.
23Letter,

Daniel E. Byrd, Assistant Field Secretary
of the National NAACP to the Executive Board of the St.
Louis NAACP, July 29, 1949, St. Louis NAACP Files.
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in part, caused some of the internal schisms,

indeed,

the national office found it necessary to set down pre
cise rules forbidding branches from participating in partiOA

san politics.

Another reason for the factionalism was

the conflicting ideas of militants and conservatives.

The

militants wanted the branch to expand its program to in
clude many new issues, and they also wanted to use the
weapon of demonstrations.

The more conservative members

were inclined to focus on one or two primary problems.
They felt that other organizations were better suited for
demonstrations, and they wanted to keep the center of their
25
attention on the courts.

From 1948 through 1953, the

duration of presidential tenure was one year.

Certainly

the constant change of presidents caused a leadership
vacuum where strong presidents had previously guided the
branch.

This leadership void encouraged the chairmen of

24
Grant Interviews, June 1, 1968, August 10, 1968.
St. Louis NAACP Branch. The Political Action Committee
File, August 27, 1946, (typewritten), St. Louis NAACP Files.
At the 37th annual conference which David Grant attended,
it was decided to restrict the activities of the branches
to purely non-partisan politics. This action was unneces
sary before because the NAACP had been overwhelmingly Re
publican orientated.
25Ruffin Interview, August 31, 1968.
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the various committees to promote their particular
spheres of concern as major projects to be undertaken by
the entire branch.

This competition between committees,

26
in turn, furthered the internal bickering.

There were

many causes for the schismatic tendencies, and the lack
of unity weakened the branch in many ways.
During the War and immediately afterwards, the NAACP
had its greatest surge in membership.

Following the war

membership peaked at about half-million mark.

27

In 1949,

the dues were increased from $1 to $2 per year, and mem
bership dropped appreciably.

The greatest decline in

membership came in the big cities, and St. Louis was one

28
of these cities.

During the last years of the war and

the years following, branch membership ranged between
5,500 and 8,000.

From 1949 through 1955, membership

29
totaled under 3,000 per year.

28Ibid?

On the national level,

Brown Interview, August 14, 1968.

2?st. James, The National Association for the Advance
ment of Colored People, pp. 54, 86-87.
28NAACP

Annual Report, New York, 1949, pp. 65-66.
Membership for 1949 was put at 248,676.
29Gloster Current, "Report of the Director of Branches
to the Missouri State Conferences of Branches," October 2,
1948, St. Louis NAACP Files? NAACP Annual Report. New York,
1951, p. 15; St. Louis NAACP Branch, "Annual Report of
Local Branch of St. Louis," 1961, p. 7.
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the sharp decline was attributed to lay offs, crop fail
ures, and the dues increase.

In St. Louis, the schismatic

condition of the branch helped to decrease membership.
The finances of the branch reflected the drop in mem
bership.

Early in 1949, individuals extended the branch

gifts and loans totaling almost $1,000 to keep it alive
until the membership drive was completed in the summer of
that year.^0

Gloster Current of the national office re

ported in 1953 that the branch started the year with a
$13.74 deficit.

He also noted that over $1,000 had been

borrowed from the branch's special fund which was supposed
to be used only for educational purposes.

31

Along with

all the other problems facing the branch, financial dif
ficulties plagued the branch in the postwar years.

Des

pite these obstacles, the branch was able to carry out an
active program.

30
St. Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes of General Member
ship Meeting, January 3, 1949, (typewritten), St. Louis
NAACP Branch, Disbursement File, June, 1949, St. Louis
NAACP Filer.
31
St. Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes of a Special Exe
cutive Board Meeting, May 9, 1953, (typewritten), St.
Louis NAACP Files. At this special meeting, a report of
Gloster Current revealed that of the $1,000 borrowed,
$555,82 had not been properly authorized.
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The branch played a restricted, but important role
in the historic case of Shelley versus Kraemer.

The

Supreme Court ruled in the Shelley Case that restrictive
covenants (private agreements among white property owners
not to sell to Negroes) could not be enforced in the
courts.32

The ruling eliminated the chief legal means

by which the Negro population of large urban centers was
kept confined to a relatively small space.

In St. Louis,

the number of restrictive convenants in St. Louis had in
creased since the World War I era until the Negro ghetto
was surrounded.

Meanwhile the Negro population of the

city had swelled so that by 1945, it was bursting at the
seams.33
One day in 1945, Leatha Shelley narrowly missed
being criminally assaulted on her way home from school.

The Shelley family set out to get away from such things
by buying a house on the 4600 block of Labadie Avenue,
34
because this neighborhood "looked decent."

32Shelley

Within two

vs. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1.

33Herman

H. Long and Charles S. Johnson, People vs.
Property; Race Restrictive Covenants, (Nashville, Tennes
see: Fisk University Press, 1947), pp. 13, 36.

34st. Louis Star Times, May 4, 1948.
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weeks after moving into their new house, the Shelleys
were served with a court summons.

They had moved into

a house that was covered by a neighborhood restrictive
covenant.

The Shelleys immediately contacted Robert

35
Bishop, the realtor who handled the sale of the house.
Bishop was a member of the Real Estate Brokers' Associa
tion which, was composed solely of Negro realtors.
association hired George L. Vaughn
Shelleys in court.

36

This

to represent the

Vaughn won his case in the circuit

court, but the decision was reversed by the Missouri
37
Supreme Court December 9, 1946.
The NAACP was also engaged with the restrictive cov
enant issue.

The National held a conference July, 1945,

in Chicago for the purpose of educating and coordinating
those involved with pertinent cases throughout the country.
George Vaughn and David Grant attended the Chicago con38
ference.

Even at this early stage, the NAACP attempted

35Vose,

Caucasians Only, pp. 109-111. Bishop was the
minister of the church which the Shelleys attended. He
bought the house from a straw party for $4,700 and sold it
to the Shelleys for $5,700.
38This

was the same George Vaughn who had served im
mediately following World War I as Chairman of the Execu
tive Board of the branch NAACP. See Chapter IV.
37Vose,
38Ibid..

Caucasians Only, pp. 116-119.
pp. 57-59, 61-64, 105.
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to select the best possible case to place before the
Supreme Court.

The NAACP was not allowed to select be

cause Vaughn unilateraly filed the Shelley case before
the Supreme Court in April, 1947.

This forced the NAACP

to file its cases before all was ready for such a move.

39

Such was the situation when the St. Louis NAACP re
ceived a letter requesting financial help for the Shelley
case.

The letter was from the Real Estate Brokers' Asso

ciation, and it pointed out that $2,000 had already been
spent getting the case before the Supreme Court.40

The

letter was forwarded to the national office with the addi
tional information that the branch in St. Louis was in no
position to give financial assistance.41

The national

office saw in this financial request a lever with which
to bring the Shelley case more directly under their super
vision.

They felt Vaughn was "lacking proper sophistica

tion and skill to handle the intricate legal complexities

39Ibid.,

p. 157.

40Letter,

Charles T. Bush to St. Louis NAACP, July 11,
1947, St. Louis NAACP Files.
41

Letter, David M. Grant to Thurgood Marshall,
July 30, 1947, St. Louis NAACP Files.
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of the problem.1,42

The NAACP held a conference in Sept

ember, 1947, in New York City to solve the problems fac
ing t. e lawyers whose cases were pending before the sup
reme Court.

George Vaughn and James T. Bush, the Presi-

43

dent of the Real Estate Brokers* Association, attended.

Soon after this conference, it became clear that all the
problems separating Vaughn and the NAACP were not solved.
The NAACP offered $1,000 to the Brokers' Association on
the condition that Vaughn would work closely with the
NAACP lawyers.

The brokers rejected the offer because

they interpreted it to mean that Vaughn was to step aside

44

as the principal attorney in the Shelley case.

During the month of September, 1947, the St. Louis
NAACP attempted to provide the financial help needed for
the Shelley case.

On September 22, the branch asked

permission of the national office to allow a mass meeting

42Clement E. Vose, "NAACP Strategy in the Covenant
Case," Western Reserve Law Review, VI, Winter, 1955, 129.
43Vose,

Caucasians Only, pp. 160-161.

44Letters,

Thurgood Marshall to David Grant, August 1,
1947, September 23, 1947. Letters, Charles T. Bush to
Thurgood Marshall, September 9, 1947, September 29, 1947.
St. Louis NAACP Files.
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45
for raising money.

This permission was forthcoming in

the same letter from Thurgood Marshall that withdrew the
AC

$1,000 pledge to the Brokers' Association.

Even before

the permission was granted, a citizens' committee was
formed and efforts were under way to raise the estimated
$6,000 or $7,000 needed to successfully complete the defense of the Shelley family.47
While it was true that the NAACP did not formally
sponsor the Shelley case, George Vaughn and tha Brokers'
Association did benefit from its efforts.

Vaughn atten

ded several conferences sponsored by the NAACP and no
doubt he profited, at least to some degree, from conver
sations with lawyers handling similar cases.

Even with

all the bickering between the NAACP and the Brokers'
Association and the resulting lack of coordination, the
organization of the attackers upon restrictive covenants

45Letters,

Ruth W. Williams, St. Louis NAACP Branch
Executive Secretary, to Gloster Current, September 22,
1947, St. Louis NAACP Files.
46Letter,

Thurgood Marshall to David Grant, October 3,
1947, St. Louis NAACP Files.
47

^'Letter, Herman Dreer, Chairman of the Citizens Com
mittee addressed to "Dear Friend," October 1, 1947, (mime
ographed), St. Louis NAACP Files. This letter was printed
on the stationery of the Brokers' Association of St. Louis.
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proved superior to the organization of the defenders of
the restrictions.

This, in large measure, proved the mar

gin of victory.48
In St. Louis, Vaughn and the brokers received strong
support from the local NAACP.

Indeed, it was hard to dis

tinguish between the brokers, the citizens' committee, and
the NAACP leadership because of the overlapping member49
ships.

without the indirect support of the national

office and the enthusiastic backing of the branch, one
can speculate that the outcome of the Shelley case might
have been different.

While the NAACP deserved and claimed

no formal recognition for this particular case,

50

to

neglect its role would be the same as disregarding an im
portant part of the story.

49Vose,

Caucasians Only, pp. 251-252.

49Ruffin

Interview, August 31, 1968; Herman Dreer,
"Negro Leadership in St. Louis: A Study in Race Relations,"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago,
1955), pp. 154-156. The Citizens Committee was largely
composed of the Executive Board of the St. Louis NAACP
and some Brokers' Association members.
50NAACP

Annual Report. New York, 1948, pp. 27-28.
The NAACP claimed credit for the other cases which were
ruled on by the Supreme Court at the same time as the
Shelley case, but specifically stated that the Shelley
case was not under its direction.
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After World War II, the branch again became involved
with the problem of segregated education.

When David

Grant took the rains of the St. Louis NAACP, he initiated
an attack on the segregation policies of Washington Uni
versity of St. Louis.

Washington University had not ad

mitted Negroes as students since the turn of the century.
In the spring of 1945, a group sponsored by the NAACP
attempted to enroll at the school, but they were informed
51
that the school did not admit Negroes.

Much of the

money that went to support Washington University was in
the form of receipts from millions of dollars worth of
tax free property in St. Louis.

From time to time, the

City of St. Louis would take the school to court in order
to collect the taxes on this property.

In an attempt to

put more pressure on Washington University, in 1945 the
branch started filing a friend of the court brief

in

connection with the city's suit against the school.

5ISt.

This

Louis Arcms. May 18, 1945; June 22, 1945.
David Grant was quoted as saying the school's policy was
"immoral and dishonest" because Negroes were barred, but
forced to contribute in an indirect way by increased
taxes necessitated by Washington University's tax-free
property holdings in the city.
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52
method failed in the courts,
but pressure, bad publicity,
and changing attitudes caused an alteration inthe admis
sion policies.

In 1947, some of the graduate and profes

sional schools were opened to Negroes, and by 1952 all
divisions admitted Negroes.
In 1943, the local NAACP attempted to get students
to apply to Hadley Technical School and Harris Teachers
College.

Both schools were administrated by the St. Louis

Board of Education.

The catholic schools of St. Louis had

desegregated, and it seemed right that the public schools
should follow suit.
St. Louis supported two teachers colleges; Stowe for
blacks and Harris for whites.
ed Stowe Teachers College.

Marjorie V. Toliver attend

In 1949, she attempted to

enter Harris Teachers College because Stowe did not offer
all the courses she wanted and because Stowe was not an
accredited school.

The State Circuit Court found in her

^Grant Interviews, June 1, 1968; August 10, 1968;
John J. Kessler, "The St. Louis Public Schools: A Survey
of Race inequalities," (mimeographed), 1950, p. 65. St.
Louis NAACP Files.
53
St. Louis Bicentennial Corp., "Negroes—Their Gift
to St. Louis," 1964, p. 8; William D. Hammack, "The Admis
sion of Negroes to Washington University," Phvlon, (Decem
ber, 1949), 415-416.
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favor.

By the time the case got to the Missouri Supreme

Court, however, Stowe had been accredited.

The Missouri

Supreme Court found the two schools "substantially equal"
54
and reversed the ruling of the lower court.
In another case initiated by the branch, Wesley H.
Brewton and Wilbert R. Brewton applied for entrance into
the previously all white Hadley Technical High School.
They attended Washington Technical High School for Negro
students.

The Hadley School included in its curriculum

an aeromechanics course which was not included at Washing
ton Technical.

In November, 1949, the circuit court

ordered the board of education to admit the Brewton bro
thers.^5

The case was taken to the Supreme Court of Mis

souri, but before the court could decide the matter, the
aeromechanics course was dropped from the curriculum at
Hadley.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Brewton

brothers, but pointed out that the case was "moot" and
should be dismissed because the course in question had

^4Toliver vs. Board of Education of St. Louis, 230
S.W. 2d, 726.
5~'St.

Louis Post-Dispatch. November 30, 1949.
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56
been abolished.

"The St. Louis Post-Dispatch summed up

the disheartened feeling of the Negro community with the
caption "Victory Without Gain.1,57
The frustration of trying to open the St. Louis public
schools turned into elation when the branch succeeded in
desegregating the St. Louis open air public swimming pools.
By 1949, Negroes had moved into the Fairgrounds Park area.
Fairgrounds Park included an open air swimming pool, but
no city-owned open air pool was open to Negroes.
branch decided to open the Fairgrounds Park pool.

The
Henry

Wheeler led several Negroes to the pool, but they were
turned away.

The NAACP asked John J. 0'Toole, Director

of Public Welfare, for a ruling.58

0'Toole issued an

order forbidding discriminatory practices at any cityeg

owned pool.

llie very next day, a near riot took place

at Fairgrounds park as Negroes attempted to swim in the
pool.

It was not until 400 policemen had been rushed to

the area that the thousands of whites and blacks were

55St.

Louis Star Times. November 14, 1950.

57
St. Louis Post-Dispatch. November 15, 1950.
58Witherspoon

Interview, August 12, 1968; Grant Inter
views, June 1, 1968, August 10, 1968.
59St.

Louis Post-Dispatch. June 21, 1949.
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placed under control.

A total of nine people were hurt in

various fights during the day.®0

Mayor Darst promptly re

scinded O'Toole's order desegregating the pools, and the
branch took the matter to court.
The branch selected the Federal Court to test the
issue.

Many of the city's high officials were sympathetic

with the NAACP's goal, but they were afraid of an angry
reaction from the city's white majority.

The officials

looked forward to the court's favorable decision as an
excuse to justify opening the pools.
In the absence of city or state statutes prohibiting
integration of open air pools, the court found in favor
of the plaintiffs, Attorney George W. Draper and Rose E.
Taylor the business secretary of the branch.

The NAACP

lawyers Henry Espy, Sidney Redmond, and Robert Witherspoon
presented the case in behalf of the plaintiffs.

The court

61
ordered the city to open its open air pools,
and by the
summer of 1950, Negroes in St. Louis enjoyed swimming pri
vileges at Fairgrounds park.

6QIbid..

June 22, 1949.

®•'•Draper and Taylor vs. City of St. Louis, 92 Fed
Supp. 546.
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Court cases were not the only activity of the St,
Louis NAACP during the years following World War II.

in

creasingly, many branch members were resorting to more
direct means of bringing about change.
picketing.

One method was

A group led by Henry Wheeler continually

picketed the American Theatre from 1944 to 1953.

Letters

were also sent to actors, playwrights, and the Actors
Equity Association in order to apply more pressure to have
62
the American Theatre stop its segregated seating policy.

Finally in 1953, the year Wheeler became president of the
branch, the theatre discontinued its discriminatory seat
ing policy.®3
Among its other activities in 1948, the local NAACP
attempted to defeat a bond issue and to have the first
Negro in the city's history placed on the school board.
The branch was successful in helping to defeat the bond
issue for slum clearance.

The branch opposed it because

no provisions were made for the people displaced by the
proposed clearance.

Also the NAACP wanted guaranteed

®2St. Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes of the General
Membership Meetings, January 5, 1948, (typewritten), St.
Louis NAACP Files.
63Ibld.,

January 5, 1953; St. Louis Globe-Democrat,
January 2, 1953. The theatre was also torn down that year.
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low-cost housing and fair treatment of Negroes in the
area after it was rebuilt.**4
The local NAACP was not successful in securing a
Negro member on the school board.

It was the Mayor's job

to fill vacancies which occurred because of death or re
signation.

When a vacancy developed in 1948, Mayor Kauf-

mann proved unresponsive to written and oral appeals cal
ling for a Negro appointment.

The NAACP, led by the Presi

dent, Guy Ruffin, picketed City Hall. This effort brought
the desired publicity, but not the appointment of a Negro
to the post.65
The subject of jobs for Negroes gained more impor
tance following World War II.

During Guy Ruffin*s admin

istration, the branch made an unsuccessful effort to dis
continue the Public Service Company's policy of hiring

66
only white bus drivers.

This attempt followed the pat

tern set by previous administrations of concentrating only

64
David Grant, Transcript of speech given on KWK
radio October 24, 1948? St. Louis NAACP Files? St. Louis
Argus, October 29, 1948.
65Ruffin

Interview, August 31, 1968? St. Louis PostDispatch, August 12, 1948.
66St.

Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes of the Executive
Board Meetings, February 10, 1948, St. Louis NAACP Files?
Ruffin Interview, August 31, 1968.
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on government or public service employment.

By the mid-

1950's, under the direction of President Herbert Brown,
the branch widened its approach to include private indus
try.

But here too the efforts of the NAACP were largely

unsuccessful.67
A good case can be made for the claim that the St.
Louis NAACP could have accomplished much more during the
postwar era if it had been more united.

A case in point
t

was the general desegregation of the St. Louis public
schools.

In 1950, the branch started making plans for a

68
test case.

Much of the work of getting the case ready

for presentation was done by the Education Committee,
chairmaned by Mrs. A. N. Vaughn.

One particular member,

Herbert Brown, who also served as the Sumner High School
P.T.A. president, spent much time researching the records
of the Board of Education.

The research led Brown and the

37Brown

Interview, August 14, 1968. Attempts were
made to have Negroes hired at Kroger Stores and South
western Bell Telephone Company. The people negotiated
which usually indicated they were sympathetic, but either
their boss or the people in the plant were opposed, and
their hands were therefore tied.
63St.

Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes of the Executive
Board Meetings, June 3, 1950. Minutes of the General
Membership Meetings, November 4, 1950, St. Louis NAACP
Files.
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Education Committee to the conclusion that such a case
69
could be started in 1952.

Two important NAACP lawyers,

David Grant and Sidney Redmond, disagreed.

The disagree

ment burst forth at a general membership meeting with the
net result that Sidney Redmond resigned from his capacity
as attorney in the proposed education suit, and the fol
lowing spring David Grant was asked to withdraw from the
70
case.

According to Herbert Brown, if some semblance

of unity had been worked out, and if the lawyers had not
been so "lackadaisical," the St. Louis NAACP could well
have had its case before the Supreme Court instead of
71
Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka.
By 1954, there was a general "internal awakening"
that the dissension hindered the effectiveness of the
branch.

Herbert Brown was approached by five different

^9Brown Interview, August 14, 1968.
''^Letter, Harvey Parham to Sidney Redmond, Novem
ber 15, 1952, St. Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes of the
Executive Board Meetings, April 4, 1953, St. Louis NAACP
Piles.
71
Brown interview, August 31, 1968.
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factions and asked if he would serve as president.

He

was elected as the fusion candidate and became the first
president to serve more than a year since the David Grant
Administration.

The branch began to solidify under

Brown's guidance, and by the end of his term, the branch
showed signs of becoming a more unified force.

CONCLUSION

The NAACP's goal has always been the elimination of
discriminatory barriers placed before the black minority.
The St. Louis branch frequently played a major role in
campaigns started by the national headquarters.

During

the World War I era as the Association argued its case
•

against the Louisville Segregation Ordianaee before the
Supreme Court, the branch fought a similar St. Louis law.
The national and the branch were eventually successful in
their respective battles, but segregated neighborhoods
were kept intact by the use of restrictive covenants.

A

generation later, restrictive covenants were declared un
enforceable by the Supreme Court,

thus destroying the

legal basis for segregated housing.

The NAACP sponsored

most of the restrictive covenant cases, and the branch
assisted a local group in bringing the historic Shelley
vs. Kraeraer Case to a successful conclusion.
Blacks were often the victims of mob action during
the first thirty years of this century.

The NAACP sought

to raise public indignation toward lynchers, and, later,
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demands were made for laws to punish mobs.

After the

East St. Louis riots of 1917, the NAACP made unsuccess
ful efforts to have the Missouri and Federal governments
enact anti-lynch laws.

Nevertheless, the Association suc

ceeded in changing the public's attitude, for by the late
1930's hardly any leader in the country justified mob
action.

The struggle against lynching illustrates how

some of the NAACP's objectives were achieved only after
many years of frustration and disappointment.
The Gaines Case was the branch's most important con
tribution to the advancement of black Americans.

By win

ning this Supreme Court case, the NAACP took the first big
step towards breaking the tradition of segregated educa
tion.

The decision made it clear that equal educational

facilities would have to be provided Negroes within each
state.

After World War II, the NAACP pressed its advant

age and made the point that the states could not or would
not provide equal education.

In 1954, the Supreme Court

agreed and reversed its "separate, but equal" ruling of
the 19th century, declaring that segregated education was
"inherently unequal."

The branch's sponsorship of the

Gaines Case assured it a place of distinction in any
study of the American Negro.
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The branch used a variety of methods to achieve its
goals.

Favorite techniques included lobbying and consul

tation with the power structure.

These methods worked

when branch leaders obtained the appointment of Missouri's
first Negro to West Point.

Although the branch never

claimed control of the St. Louis Negro vote, it did on
occasion threaten city officials with that vote.

The

branch opposed several bond issues to force concessions
from city authorities on issues which the branch felt
crucial to the black community,

rv bring discriminatory

practices to the public's attention and to advertise its
work, the branch always encouraged publicity.

In 1945,

the branch started using a new publicity tactic—demon
strations.

The tactic was effective at department store

cafeterias and at the American Theatre.

Litigation was

the most reliable method used by the branch.

Aside from

its involvement in the Gaines and Shelley cases, the
branch was active in many lesser known snits.

Some were

successful, such as the Draper Case which opened the out
door swimming pools of St. Louis to Negroes and the suit
against the University of Missouri in 1950 which unlocked
the University doors to black students.

Other court cases
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did not provide immediate victories, but in every in
stance the desired change eventually developed.
Certain branch characteristics were found in every
period.

Branch activities were usually the result of

outside stimulation.

The national office gave the dir

ection and support needed by the branch for its major
undertakings, and most of the branch presidents were not
native St. Louisans.

The Gaines Case provides the best

illustration of this theme.

The national office furnished

the basic plan, organization, and legal aid.

The two

branch leaders who handled the case had lived in St.
Louis for less than eight years.
Disunity was another branch trait.

Disagreements

over goals and tactics often led to cleavages among mem
bers.

At times, divisions were so intense they hindered

the effectiveness of the branch.

After World War II the

branch was especially racked with internal dissension and
suffered for it.

,

Branch leadership has undergone considerable change
since 1914,

At first prominent whites were sought for

the office of president.

They served usefully during

the first ten years and added prestige to the Association.
Most of the work, however, was done by the black chairman
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of the executive board.

After a black man assumed the

presidency that office became the most important in the
branch.

Lawyers held office from 1934 to 1948, and liti

gation increased greatly during those years.

Until 1945,

the president had always been a Republican with a profes
sional background.

The year 1945 not only started the

Democratic party ascendancy in the branch, which reflect
ed a change in the voting habits of the black St. Louisan,
but also witnessed a marked change in the character of
the rank and file.

Previously most of the members were

of the middle or upper middle class.

Membership status

had shifted downward as the Association widened its base.
The change was mirrored with a nev? type of branch presi
dent.

Many presidents after 1945 were Democrats holding

non-professional or semi-professional occupations.
Changes in leadership types and membership status
were not the only alterations which took place during
the branch's history.

The NAACP has proved itself a

flexible organization as tactics were frequently changed,
and as one goal was reached new ones were pursued.

The

basic objective of the NAACP, the attainment of firstclass citizenship for blacks, has always been the same.
A good deal of progress has been made in obtaining this
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objective, and the St. Louis NAACP played a conspicuous
part in this endeavor.
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APPENDIX #2

MEMBERSHIP—NA&CP

St. Louis Branch

National

1914

3,000

1914

1918

40,000

1918

1,000

1925

125,000

1925

800

1935

150,000

1935

1,500

1947

400,000

1948

7,500

1950

225,000

1950

3,000

1955

200,000

1955

2,700

1960

250,000

1960

7,000

NOTE:

1st Year

These figures are estimates based on many sourcei*
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